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Abstract  A recurring problem for international environmental governance has been the legal participation of the United States (US). Due to a number of unique domestic institutional and political conditions, the US is effectively trapped in a ‘ratification straitjacket’. This has made US ratification of most environmental treaties impossible. It has been a crucial obstacle given the role of the US as the foremost great power of the developed world and formerly as a hegemon. Despite the importance of this obstacle to environmental multilateralism, it has attracted little sustained, direct academic scrutiny. Moreover, the rise of China and a multipolar world provides unique opportunities to consider different approaches to managing US ratification and participation in environmental regimes. This thesis attempts to address this gap in the literature through two research questions:  
1. How US ratification and participation be effectively enabled within an effective international architecture for environmental governance?   
2. How can effective environmental governance without the US (or other recalcitrant states) be enabled through; major international institutions, decision-making processes, and operational treaties?   
 This thesis is structured as a thesis by publication that is composed of four peer-reviewed papers along with a context statement that covers the introduction, methods, discussion and conclusion. The four papers focus primarily on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The thesis examines how US ratification and participation can be addressed in the context of an international institution (UNEP and a potential World Environment Organisation), multilateral decision-
 
vii making (consensus and majority voting in the UNFCCC) and treaty design (a future climate agreement). 
 The results suggest that there are primarily two ways of dealing with US participation, both of which involve some form of plurilateralism. First, governance arrangements can attempt to pursue US participation by appealing to its interests in fragmentation and allowing for the use of presidential-executive agreements. Alternatively, an international regime can be constructed to bypass US ratification and instead attempt to maximise the participation of other states as well as willing subnational actors within the US. The former approach is termed ‘inclusive critical mass governance’. In contrast, the latter is labelled as ‘exclusive critical mass governance’. Both strategies to address US ratification rely on the use of semi-globalism and thus challenge the current dominant paradigm of creating consensus-based, broad-but-shallow international agreements. Based upon this, a theory of plurilateralism and accompanying theoretical framework is developed. The theory and framework of critical mass governance suggests that a small group of progressive actors can create the political, social and economic feedbacks necessary to spread environmental actions and encourage increasing cooperation over time. Where the feedbacks exist, there is a greater need to encourage a critical mass of progressive actions rather than incorporate the US. Ultimately, the success of international environmental governance does not necessarily depend upon the leadership or participation of the US, but simply the action of a critical mass.   
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Chapter I: Introduction  
 The world faces a number of interlinked environmental problems that pose a 
systemic threat to global civilisation. Human impacts on the Earth system have become 
so ubiquitous and powerful that some have labelled modern times the ‘Anthropocene’, an 
age where humans are significant drivers of global environmental changes (Steffen et al. 
2011; Steffen et al. 2007; Crutzen 2006). The majority of this change has been 
environmentally detrimental, resulting in climate change, biodiversity loss, ocean 
acidification and desertification, among other impacts. Many have claimed that we are 
reaching ecological tipping points and passing the ‘planetary boundaries’ within which 
humanity can safely exist, particularly in terms of biodiversity loss and climate change 
(Rockström et al. 2009). The causes and effects of these environmental problems are 
global in nature, originating from and affecting numerous different nation states.   
The challenges of governing the Earth system have prompted numerous multilateral 
responses in recent decades. More than 900 environmental treaties are currently in force 
(Biermann 2012). Unfortunately, the number of international responses has not been 
matched in terms of their success. This is illustrated by the poor track records of the two 
most important global environmental regimes: the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). Many consider the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC to be a failure due 
to its inability to significantly curb global emissions (Victor 2009; Rayner 2010; Prins 
and Rayner 2007). However, it has provided numerous policies and procedures that 
continue to underpin domestic and international efforts. These include the targets and 
timetables approach and the use of emissions trading. The CBD has missed its initial 




continued largely unabated and will likely do so into the future despite significant 
opportunities for policy interventions (Pereira et al. 2010). Many other threats such as 
ocean acidification have yet to be addressed or even recognised through international law 
(Kim 2012). In short, international environmental governance is failing to address the 
challenges of the Anthropocene. 
International environmental issues are complex and wicked problems that pose unique 
challenges to the international community. These include the risk of catastrophic impacts 
and their intergenerational and international scale. In terms of international scale and 
cooperation scholars have put forward a number of reasons for the shortcomings of 
international environmental governance. These range from institutional fragmentation 
(Biermann et al. 2009), through to a lack of authority vested in existing institutions and 
an absence of legitimacy (Esty and Ivanova 2001).While there is evidence that highlights 
the importance of these different issues, none are a clear-cut Achilles heel for global 
attempts at environmental regulation. Many authors contest that institutional 
fragmentation is a reality that could be beneficial and lead to system resilience through 
institutional diversity and redundancy (Kim 2013; Abbott 2014). Similarly, there is no 
distinct causal relationship between input legitimacy and regime impact. I contend that 
while there are important considerations, the failings of international environmental 
governance are primarily due to the absence of leadership from the United States (US) 
and a mismatch between existing institutions and geopolitical realities. I will support this 
argument through the following introductory chapter. Ultimately, an insistence upon 
universal, consensus-based treaties and US participation has left global environmental 





1.1 United We Stand, Divided We Stall:  The Importance and Limits of US 
Environmental Leadership  
  In many cases, US involvement in international environmental treaties has been 
problematic. The US has a long history of signing and then being unable to ratify 
multilateral environmental agreements and instruments. This includes the Kyoto 
Protocol, as well as other examples such as the 1989 Convention on the Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; the 1991 Geneva Protocol 
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds and their 
Transboundary Fluxes; the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context; the 1992 CBD; the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty; the 1998 Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade UNEP/FAO; and the 2001 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Schreurs et al. 2009). Numerous 
other instruments have been neither signed nor ratified, including the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters and the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This 
list of signed and unratified and also unsigned and unratified environmental treaties seems 
likely to expand because the problem is deeply rooted in the US Constitution and 
domestic political landscape. 
The US has a number of domestic institutional arrangements, that have made their 
engagement with international agreements difficult. First, Article II of the US 
Constitution requires a two-thirds supermajority vote in the Senate for the ratification of 
any international treaty (Skodvin and Andresen 2009). Second, enabling domestic 
legislation must already be in place before ratification can take place (Bang et al. 2012).  




takes the process of ratification very seriously. International actions are determined by 
domestic processes and considerations, more so than in many other nation states. 
Problems with engaging international law arise when these onerous institutional 
requirements are combined with both the domestic politics and foreign policy stance of 
the US. 
The nature of US politics often makes it difficult to implement legislation, particularly 
with respect to environmental issues. For example, action on climate change is 
constrained by the presence of senators, in the upper house, from a number of oil- and 
coal-producing states (Skodvin and Andresen 2009) and the increasingly partisan and 
polarised political debate over climate change science and mitigation (Bang et al. 2012). 
Moreover, both the Senate and House of Representatives are vulnerable to lobbying by 
vested interests and industrial bodies, particularly the entrenched fossil fuel lobby 
(DeSombre 2000). As Brenton observes, ‘In the US there is more dependence on cheap 
energy, more scepticism about the science, less willingness to submit to international 
economic regulation, and a political system more open to industrial lobbying than, for 
example, in the EU’ (2013: 543).  Another constraining factor has been the attitude of the 
US towards multilateral engagement through the United Nations (UN). It is well 
documented that the US has historically, across numerous different administrations, 
shown a distrust of UN-based multilateralism and involvement with international 
bureaucracies (Patrick 2002), particularly any related to international environmental law 
(Brunnee 2008).  At its worst, this has led to ‘American exceptionalism’, an unusual 
situation in which the US has not become institutionally enmeshed with many of the 




institutions and politics means that in the context of cooperation with international 
environment governance institutions, the US is essentially in a ‘ratification straitjacket’1.    
The ratification straitjacket is not automatic: it occurs only when political opposition 
uses domestic processes and structures to stall and block ratification. The US ratification 
system is vulnerable to abuse, but is not inherently biased against international 
cooperation. Indeed, many agreements are passed through the Senate without issue or 
delay. This highlights the key link between domestic politics and the ratification 
straitjacket. International environmental cooperation is often constrained by the 
ratification straitjacket due to political controversy over domestic environmental 
regulation. As noted above, the politics of the environment in the US are particularly 
divisive. Historically, environmental regulation has only succeeded when there is a strong 
‘Baptists-and-Bootleggers’ coalition between environmental advocates and impacted 
industries (DeSombre 2000). This rarely occurs and where there is a lack of domestic 
policy it is unlikely that the US can engage internationally. A case in point is climate 
change, with the non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol accompanied by a failure to adopt 
federal-level mitigation policy.   
But why is US leadership, or even participation, so crucial to the success of an 
international environmental regime? One reason is its capacity for financial contributions 
to different treaties and multilateral bodies; another is its status as a significant polluter 
with respect to a range of environmental problems. Downie has termed this as ‘the 
exploitative power to destroy’ (1999: 104), a power that it potentially possesses in 
abundance as the second largest greenhouse gas emitter. There is also a deeper 
institutional and cultural reason: the international need for leadership in multilateral 
1 This term will be used throughout the thesis.   
 
                                                             
16 
 
environmental agreements (MEAs). The US appears to play a special role in this regard 
and possesses a certain mystique within the international community. While there is a 
lack of empirical data and literature on this topic, part of it may be historical. The reign 
of the US has often led to its participation and leadership being the key ingredient for a 
successful regime, as was the case with the Montreal Protocol on the control of ozone-
depleting substances (Thoms 2002; Spencer 2007). Many countries refused to ratify the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol due to the absence of the US, and (as 
will be shown in Chapter V and the epilogue) the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was 
crafted to allow for their legal participation. While it may not always have a numerical or 
logical premise, the world appears to culturally crave US leadership on environmental 
issues. Despite this importance to the success of regimes, there are still limits to US power 
and importance in environmental multilateralism. 
There have been many cases of treaties or provisions being adopted despite US 
opposition. The 1990 London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol and the deep seabed 
provision of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are two important 
examples. Similarly, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
were adopted and entered into force despite the obstructionist role the US played (Falkner 
2000, 2005). However, the US has still not ratified UNCLOS, the Cartagena Protocol or 
the Kyoto Protocol, and all have been far from successful. While there is likely a range 
of factors contributing to their lack of effectiveness, the lack of US participation is one of 
the strongest ones, as has been noted by some commentators in relation to the Kyoto 
Protocol (Purvis and Stevenson 2010; Victor 2011). The Montreal Protocol and London 
Amendments proceeded despite US objections due to the presence of majority voting in 




 Thus, while US participation may not be necessary for regime creation, its 
engagement appears to be important for long-term regime effectiveness.2 Grundig and 
Ward (2015) conducted a review of MEAs under the International Regime Database, to 
see what conditions of structural leadership are necessary to enable effective international 
environmental cooperation. They found that any group of leaders pushing for progressive 
measures must have greater structural power, and social capital, than laggard coalitions 
who oppose them. Additionally, ‘The pusher coalition in terms of structural power 
increases regime effectiveness as long as the US is a member of this coalition’ (Grundig 
and Ward 2015: 2). Thus, it appears that successful structural leadership must come from 
an alliance that includes the US. If we accept these findings, it would appear that US 
involvement is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for regime success, and that ‘In 
the long run, US participation is essential to providing effective solutions to global 
environmental problems’ (Falkner 2005: 591). Due to its material power, influence and 
power to destroy as a polluter, the US possesses a veto power of sorts over the 
effectiveness of environmental regimes. The power to destroy argument is the weakest. 
On a numerical level, the pollution levels of the US are rarely high enough to give them 
a de facto veto. For example, the US currently accounts for 15% of carbon dioxide 
emissions, while China is worth 29% and the EU 11% (PBL 2014). Yet its financing, 
technology, political influence and ability to coerce or incentivise others to act in tandem 
are significant to regime success. As the largest developed economy and one of the most 
technologically advanced countries, the US has substantial leverage within climate 
negotiations in particular. This is noticeable in its dominance during discussions on 
technology transfer mechanisms and climate financing.  Moreover, their inaction does 
2 Regime effectiveness refers to the ability of the regime to create cooperative actions that 
address the underlying collective action problem. 
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provide a political excuse for other polluters to resist mitigation measures. Concerns over 
free-riding, leakage and a loss of competitiveness caused by environmental regulation all 
become more pertinent arguments in a world where the foremost developed great power 
is a laggard. It would appear that US leadership, in some shape or form, is critical to the 
fate of international environmental governance.   
 Based on the work of Young (1989, 1991, 1998), there are predominantly four 
different types of leadership: intellectual, instrumental, power-based and directional. 
Intellectual leadership is the generation of ideas or systems of thought that both frame 
and encourage cooperation (Young 1991) while instrumental leadership sets the political 
agenda and in doing so often draws upon the idea of intellectual leaders. Power-based 
leadership uses coercion and incentives to shape outcomes and directional leadership is 
the setting of an example in dealing with a problem (Andresen and Agrawala 2002: 42). 
The directional, instrumental and power-based leadership are practised by nation states, 
while intellectual leadership can be provided by individuals.  Interestingly, the US has 
been the foremost leader in terms of power-based and instrumental leadership for both 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, having 
significantly shaped the outcomes (Andresen and Agrawala 2002). This is significant 
since this thesis focuses on case studies of both the climate regime and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), the latter of which was shaped by the outcomes of the 
Rio Conference. Despite its inability to ratify the resulting legal instrument, the US 
largely moulded the Kyoto Protocol, especially in terms of market-based and flexibility 
mechanisms (Grubb et al. 1999). Yet in many cases, the leadership of the US was power-





It is likely that at least some of the fragmentation of environmental governance has 
been an outcome of US leadership in regime creation. US reluctance to ratify 
environmental treaties has often led it to create and promote alternative arrangements and 
institutions to address multilateral environmental problems. This has led to fragmentation, 
intentionally or not, which better suits US preferences for forum-shopping and 
decentralised international environmental governance. This is particularly noticeable in 
the climate regime, where there has been a proliferation of institutions beyond the 
UNFCCC initiated by either the US or Australia (the original non-ratifying states of the 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol) (Vihma 2009; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
Van Asselt 2009). 3  The creation of the Major Economies Forum and Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate are examples of this ploy to challenge 
Kyoto (Christoff 2006). Indeed, the partnership appeared to embody and promote a 
‘deregulatory ecological modernisation’ discourse that was often in direct tension with 
the UNFCCC and its associated principles (McGee and Taplin 2009). These alternative 
forums have also been simple ‘talking shops’ that do not seek to make hard international 
rules, laws and regulations. It is an approach that fits the ideological and institutional 
preferences of the US. The missing ingredient for many institutions has been directional 
leadership, something that has been in short supply since the creation of the UNFCCC 
(Andresen and Agrawala 2002). The EU has provided some leadership, such as enticing 
Russia to join the Kyoto Protocol and enable its entry into force. However, its targets are 
not reflective of true directional leadership and it has been overshadowed by the US in 
terms of influencing and shaping the rules and structure of the climate regime. Yet 
directional leadership is arguably the most important form of leadership, and is needed to 
3 Australia is now a member of Kyoto, having ratified the agreement in 2007.  
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inspire action across the developing–developed nation divide and spur implementation 
beyond regime creation. It is also important to note that leadership by developed 
countries, such as the US, is written into the rules and provisions of the UNFCCC. Article 
4.2(a) requires developed countries to demonstrate that they are ‘taking the lead in 
modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions’. The absence of leadership 
from the US has provided legal and political cover for developing countries to avoid their 
own mitigation responsibilities. With respect to the climate regime, Purvis and Stevenson 
have declared that we ‘must accept the reality that US leadership is not only warranted 
but also essential to avoiding unacceptable risks of catastrophic climate change’ (2010: 
29). The US needs to provide a model of mitigation at home for others to follow, and both 
champion and ratify strong international frameworks in order to provide effective 
directional leadership for international environmental governance. While the US has been 
capable of some degree of power-based and instrumental leadership, their ratification 
straitjacket has made directional leadership impossible in recent times. 
While the US is still undoubtedly important to multilateral success, its ability to craft 
and maintain regimes is declining; its position as a ‘hegemon’ is coming under increasing 
challenge and perhaps even failing. The notion of leadership is similar to the international 
relations theory of ‘hegemonic stability’. This theory posits that the success and failure 
of international regimes depends upon the presence of a single dominant actor – the 
hegemon – which will provide the stability and conditions required to create outcomes 
that are beneficial to all states (Snidal 1985; Eichengreen 1989). A hegemon is a dominant 
actor that can make others want what it wants (Wade 2002), rather than simply relying 
upon its superior military or economic power. In this sense, a hegemon’s influence is 
subtle, yet enduring, as it shapes the international system to reflect its own norms and 




which the time of hegemonic rule is marked by order and stability and the decline of a 
hegemon, as we are arguably experiencing now, is marked by strain and volatility 
(Grunberg 1990). 
The theory does seem to have some explanatory power when applied to the recent 
track record of environmental regimes. Spencer (2007) contends that the hegemonic 
influence of the US was the key determinant of the success of the Montreal Protocol and 
the failure of the climate regime thus far, with the US championing the former and acting 
as a laggard in the latter. The Montreal Protocol is widely regarded, by states, civil society 
and the scientific community, as the most successful international environmental legal 
instrument in history, while the Kyoto Protocol is lamented as a missed opportunity.  
Some blame the absence of US ratification as the main source of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
inadequacies (Victor 2009).  In contrast, Depledge (2005) observes that the persistence 
of the Kyoto Protocol despite the withdrawal of the US has gone against the predictions 
of hegemonic stability theory; the non-ratification by the US led to a renewal in 
cooperative spirit rather than a collapse. Yet the Kyoto Protocol has not led to a significant 
reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions (Prins et al. 2010) and this renewed 
momentum and willingness to work without the US has not lasted. The UNFCCC 
negotiations are now developing towards a likely inadequate, but US-backed, ‘pledge and 
review’4 (Hare et al. 2010) model, largely in order to appease American interests.  
The US has been extremely successful in moulding the trajectory of the negotiations 
beyond the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, there has been no significant overall 
success in achieving multilateral agreements on urgent issues since the early 1990s (Naim 
2009), a trend which coincides with the gradual decline of US hegemony and rise of 
4 This form of treaty will be explained and explored in depth in Chapter V.  
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China. The two previous statements may seem paradoxical: the failure of multilateral 
endeavours is related to declining US hegemony and multipolarity, yet the US is still the 
main shaper of multilateral environmental affairs. The US may no longer be a hegemon, 
but as the foremost great power of the developed world it still has enormous influence. 
Moreover, the decline of US hegemony has changed some of both their interests and 
actions, making US environmental leadership less likely and US obstructionism 
increasingly familiar. 
 While it is still a point of ongoing debate, the idea of US hegemonic decline and 
the movement from a unipolar world to a multipolar one is fast becoming conventional 
wisdom.  A variety of reasons have been posited for the decline of US hegemony.  Layne 
(2011) attributes the decline to military overexpansion, economic problems including the 
fiscal crisis (potentially weakening the role of the US dollar as the international reserve 
currency) and, perhaps most importantly, the rapid rise of new great powers such as 
China, India and Brazil. Wallerstein (2013) contends that the fall of US hegemony is now 
inevitable and has been driven primarily by its own actions, particularly militarily, which 
has drained its economy and impaired its ideological legitimacy.  Others have taken a 
more moderate view. Zakari argues that the story is less about the fall of the US and more 
about the rise of others: ‘America remains the global superpower today but it is an 
enfeebled one’ (Zakaria 2011: 217).  The US may be a superpower, but it is no longer the 
only superpower on the world stage. China is now the world’s largest greenhouse gas 
emitter and, according to the International Monetary Fund, the largest economy in terms 
of purchasing-power parity (The World's Biggest Economies: China's back  2014). China 
has not taken on the mantle of a global leader in terms of regime creation and reform, and 
looks unlikely to do so for some time to come. The interests of China, for now, appear to 




and India means that it is improbable that the world will find itself in another unipolar or 
bipolar structure in the near future; a multipolar world appears to be the most likely future. 
Accordingly, it is no longer tenable to think of the US as a superpower or hegemon, terms 
that imply a sole dominance within the international system. It is a great power and the 
strongest great power of the developed world, but there can be no hegemon in the new 
multipolar world. 
There is strong evidence to suggest that the structural power of the US has previously 
granted them a virtual veto over MEAs and made their participation, if not leadership, 
indispensable. Yet the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world raises a number of 
interesting questions, particularly regarding whether US leadership and ratification will 
continue to be as vital to the success of international environmental governance as it once 
was. Even the previously mentioned work of Grundig and Ward is based upon data that 
predates the US shift away from environmental multilateralism in the 1990s (2015: 9). It 
is now uncertain whether US directional leadership is necessary for environmental regime 
success in the 21st century.  This thesis argues that the US is no longer a hegemon or 
international superpower that is essential for the success of multilateral environmental 
regimes. Yet they are still the foremost great power of the developed world and their 
previous hegemonic status and the cultural appeal of their leadership still makes their 
involvement preferable, and perhaps even necessary, in the short term. Accordingly, this 
thesis will explore options for both circumventing and allowing for US participation in 
effective international environmental governance. While managing US participation and 
ratification is still a key to achieving success in addressing environmental problems, the 
transition from a unipolar to multipolar world provides some unique opportunities for 
circumventing US veto power and the need for US directional leadership. Capitalising 




institutions, together with the related conduct and practices of environmental 
multilateralism. 
 
1.2 The New Game of Governance: New Geopolitical Conditions  
 
 The world continues to undergo a significant shift in the global geopolitical order, 
but our governance structures and approaches do not fit these new realities. We are 
potentially in a post-hegemonic world, and there is now a fundamental misfit between 
geopolitics and governance structures. Von Moltke (2001) argues that a proper fit 
between the problem structure and institutions employed to address the problem is the 
key to determining regime effectiveness. Politics are part of the problem, and there is 
currently a mismatch between existing practices and new political realities. I suggest that 
the two fundamental changes that underpin this international order transition are the 
movement from a unipolar world based on US hegemony to a multipolar world; and the 
subsequent change in institutional norms and rules that reflect the decline of the US.  Both 
of these developments are key causes for both the failure of US environmental leadership 
and the wider woes of environmental multilateralism.   
 
1.2.1 The Rise of a Multipolar World 
 A key condition for governance in the 21st century is the reality of a world with 
numerous political centres of gravity ranging from Washington to Beijing to Brussels: the 
reality of a multipolar, not a unipolar, world. Climate change and wider environmental 
issues are geopolitical problems (Streck and Terhalle 2013). Roberts (2011) describes the 
newly emerging political dynamics and balance of power as a ‘new world (dis)order’ 




fragmentation of the G775 and the weakening of the EU.  The economic and political rise 
of the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China and) bloc or BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China) is significant, as it has contributed strongly to both the fragmentation of the 
G77+China group and the challenging of US superiority. The BASIC bloc, as a group of 
emerging powers, is drawn together by shared concerns over access to the global 
commons, such as atmospheric space, and is an alliance that is likely to persist for some 
time to come (Hallding et al. 2013).  Their coherence is geopolitical and economic, but is 
also intrinsically tied to the concern that access to global resources will be limited. They 
have also made a point of challenging the existing neoliberal international order both 
rhetorically and politically (Hurrell 2006). Competitiveness concerns with the US have 
been fuelled by this rise of the BRICs to challenge the existing hegemonic order and the 
relative decline of the US (Roberts 2011). This has in turn contributed to the US’s 
reluctance to lead by ratifying treaties or to provide strong directional leadership. An 
example of this is the Byrd–Hagel Resolution6 prior to the Kyoto Protocol, in which the 
Senate agreed that the US would not take any binding domestic mitigation actions unless 
China and other major emerging economies were also legally bound to domestic targets 
and action. The enduring problem of cooperation through MEAs is developing country 
involvement and fears over free-riding and relative economic losses (Pauwelyn 2007; 
Thoms 2002). The rise of a multipolar world has meant that the US is now preoccupied 
with maintaining competitiveness and order, rather than providing leadership in a new 
area of governance. The emergence of multipolarity has also undermined and transformed 
5 The major group developing countries, created in 1964, which often negotiate as a bloc within 
the UN. The group was originally composed of 77 members, but has since swelled in size to 
133. 
6 S.RES.98, 105th Congress, 1st session. (1997). 
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the rules and processes that were created during US hegemony, such as weighted voting 
in the Bretton Woods institutions.   
 
1.2.2 Rules and Norms after Hegemony 
The decline of US hegemony has led to a collective questioning of the rules and norms 
that underpin the international political system. A hegemon solidifies its rule through both 
a belief in the substance of its preferred order and a degree of trust in and perceived 
legitimacy of the associated procedures and rules. Ikenberry (2011) contends that the 
BRICs do not want to challenge the existing rules and principles of the international order; 
rather, they simply seek to increase their own voice and authority within it. This may be 
partially true; however, the rise of the BRICs has resulted in some institutional changes 
that have far-reaching implications. This idea will be explored in depth in Chapter V of 
this thesis. In summary, the erosion of US hegemony and the rise of a multipolar world 
has driven a shift  in decision-making away from weighted voting and limited-
membership UN treaties and bodies7 and towards interlinked consensus decision-making 
and a desire for universal participation. I will argue that this paradigm is not suited for 
maximising the opportunities attendant on multipolarity, or for addressing the issue of US 
participation, and that this is evident from the recent failures of multilateralism.    
The deadlocked negotiations in many forums, particularly the climate and trade 
regimes, has catalysed a multitude of proposed multilateral alternatives and sparked a 
series of important debates on the nature of governance. Below I detail two of the debates 
most important for this thesis and their linkages to the issue of US participation. The 
7 Although the latter is experiencing resurgence outside of the UN due to the failures of UN 
based processes. It should be noted that the majority of these new minilateral bodies are 
dialogue and consensus based endeavours, in contrast to the more operational and voting based 
Bretton Woods Institutions.  
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discussion chapter of this thesis (Chapter VII) places the results of my research into the 
context of these two debates. One key debate is over the dimensions of international 
treaties (ambition, compliance and participation) and whether treaty design (and perhaps 
even institutional structure) should prioritise participation or substance. In a similar vein, 
the debate over minilateralism versus multilateralism highlights the importance of 
participation. It suggests that effective environmental governance can be enabled by 
limiting the number of participating governments, in particular that multilateralism 
should be limited to a few powerful states that matter most in managing the environmental 
problem at hand. I will discuss this key approach in the following section.  
 
1.3 Framing the Debate on Participation I: Minilateralism vs Multilateralism  
 Minilateralism is an emerging discourse within both academia and politics that is 
attracting support from academic commentators, diplomats and politicians. It focuses on 
simplifying multilateral negotiations by reducing the number of parties, generally to those 
whose collective action is necessary to solve the common problem. There has been 
increasing dialogue on using minilateralism, particularly within the climate regime, with 
commentators suggesting that progress can be achieved by simplifying negotiations 
through limiting the number of parties involved. Just for the UNFCCC there have been 
multiple proposals for both exclusive (Victor 2009) and inclusive minilateral forums 
(Eckersley 2012). Naim (2009) refers to the ‘magic number’ of bringing the smallest 
collection of parties to a forum while maintaining the largest impact, and believes the 
UNFCCC should adopt a G20 style format to only include the major emitters of the world. 
Eckersley (2012)  presents a more moderate and inclusive approach, where a minilateral 
climate council would operate on differentiated representation of not only the most 




minilateralism both academically and politically displays an ‘emerging discourse’ that 
could have profound implications for diplomatic multilateral practice, particularly within 
the UNFCCC (McGee 2011; Brummer 2014). This has led some to speculate that 
‘multilateralism has lost favour and credibility, while minilateralism appears to be an idea 
whose time has come’ (Stevenson and Dryzek 2012: 2). Yet this thesis posits that 
minilateralism is a misdiagnosis of the problem: the fundamental problem of 
environmental multilateralism is not numbers, but power. The problem is not based on 
arithmetic, but centres on the role of the US, the most powerful actor. The implications 
of my research for this framing debate are further explored in Chapter VII, as are the links 
to the second framing debate of treaty participation.  
 
1.3.2 Framing the Debate on Participation II: Ambition, Participation and 
Compliance within International Treaties  
 The effectiveness of an international agreement is determined by the dual factors 
of participation and substance. ‘Participation’ is simply the number of state parties 
involved, while ‘substance’ refers to the legality, targets, structures, and compliance and 
review provisions embodied within the agreement (Raustiala 2005). One way to 
conceptualise international agreements is as an interplay between participation and 
substance that results in agreements that either prioritise participation over the loss of 
substance (‘broad-but-shallow’), or sacrifice participation for greater ambition and legal 
structure (‘narrow-but-deep’) (Aldy et al. 2003). In the context of the climate regime, the 
former has high or full participation with little per party mitigation while the latter has 
greatly restricted participation with much higher mitigation levels per party. Bodansky 
(2012a) provides a similar framework by breaking down an agreement into participation, 




at the cost of participation and/or compliance, while an agreement with universal 
participation will generally have the price of a lowest common denominator outcome with 
substantially lower ambition (Bodansky 2012b), particularly with a consensus-based 
decision-making system. Treaty design is by nature a game of trade-offs with a spectrum 
of options between the extreme models of broad-but-shallow and narrow-but-deep. 
 The framing of participation and substance is particularly useful in light of the US 
ratification straitjacket. An agreement, or institution, is likely to be significantly watered 
down to enable US participation (and may still run the risk of not being ratified as 
occurred with Kyoto); however, a loss of cost-effectiveness, environmental integrity (to 
some extent), free-riding concerns and potential political backlash will be the price to pay 
for a treaty that excludes the US and other key parties (Falkner et al. 2010; Aldy et al. 
2003). Navigating the issue of US participation is ultimately the same conundrum as 
treaty effectiveness in general: it is a balancing act between participation on one hand, 
and substance on the other.   
 Both of these framing debates on participation are crucial to understanding the 
likely direction of international environmental governance, and underlying both is the 
principal issue of the participation of the US. Debates on participation and treaty design 
are also at the heart of debates about US participation, and answering key questions 





1.4 Research Questions  
The failure to address global ecological crises has been widespread and not confined 
to a single institution or practice.  Thus, any research into governance models that can 
circumvent the need for US ratification, fit new geopolitical conditions and improve 
environmental multilateralism must explore different institutional levels and regimes. 
Accordingly, the research questions for this thesis are as follows: 
1. How can US ratification and participation be effectively enabled within 
an effective international architecture for environmental governance?   
2. How can effective environmental governance without the US (or other 
recalcitrant states) be enabled through; major international institutions, decision-
making processes, and operational treaties?   
 
This thesis explores how multilateralism can be transformed to deal with the 
conundrum of US participation at the institutional, decision-making and operational 
treaty levels. While it is not the central focus of this thesis, the research (particularly in 
Chapter VII) will also consider how multilateral activities can enable and push 
environmental policy domestically within the US. The research focuses on case studies 
of the attempted reform, and reform options, in the UNEP and the UNFCCC. The first 
(UNEP, covered in Chapter III) investigates the reform of a ‘major international 
institution structure’.  The decision-making and treaty design aspects of the second 
research question are examined using the UNFCCC (Chapters IV, V and VI). Reform 
options are a central focus, since if leadership and a lack of fit are fundamental problems 
undermining environmental multilateralism, then a key goal is to provide momentum and 




The central tenet of this thesis is that international governance on environmental 
issues no longer needs to rely upon the stability and leadership provided by a hegemon. 
Nor does it necessarily need to rely on the Sisyphean task of achieving complete global 
agreement.  
 
1.5 Thesis Scope  
  
This is a broad thesis by nature and has therefore focused on particular issues and 
actors. The thesis focuses on nation states, as they are the principal actors in international 
environmental governance. As part of a Westphalian UN system, nation states are the 
decision-makers and policy shapers of the main intergovernmental negotiations and 
bodies that constitute the major structures of international environmental governance. 
Despite the rise of non-state actors and the increasing prominence of non-state networks, 
states remain the focal point of the international system and the most fundamental units 
within intergovernmental environmental bodies. Given the focus of this thesis upon 
intergovernmental regimes (UNEP and the UNFCCC) and the role of the US (a nation 
state), it is both intuitive and logical to make states the centrepiece of the analysis. For 
example, Chapter IV focuses on decision-making, and the actors with voting and veto 
power within both of the institutions are states, with non-state actors having a more 
marginal role. However, non-state actors are considered, where relevant. For example, 
insights from interviews with non-state respondents (from non-governmental 
organisations [NGOs], academia and elsewhere) are an important source of data in the 
thesis, and Chapter VI draws on the role of subnational actors in the US. This is necessary 
due to the importance of domestic considerations in the formulation of US positions and 




 This research takes a qualitative focus with a particular use of tools from systems 
thinking such as feedback analysis (see Chapter II for further details).  While others in 
the field of international environmental governance have used game theory and 
quantitative rational actor-based models, this thesis does not. Most rational actor models, 
and game theory in particular, have a number of weaknesses (Colman 2003) and have 
repeatedly failed in the prediction of complex negotiations outcomes (Freedman 2013). 
Additionally, this thesis blends theoretical views primarily from both neorealism and 
constructivism, with a neoliberalist focus on international institutions. It is intentionally 
a project of theoretical eclecticism and a range of different theories are drawn on where 
relevant (particularly in the discussion chapters). 
 Third, this thesis centres upon the climate regime and, to a lesser extent, UNEP as 
the case studies for exploring governance without US ratification. While other potential 
useful case studies exist (such as the CBD, which has never been ratified by the US), they 
have been selected for a number of reasons. The climate regime has by far the largest 
body of academic literature analysing it, particularly in terms of the framing debates of 
minilateralism versus multilateralism and treaty dynamics.  It is also particularly 
interesting and relevant given ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC on decision-
making (see Chapter IV) and the upcoming 2015 Paris climate summit that is seeking a 
new climate agreement (see Chapters V and VI). Thus, there is both an abundance of 
information as well as a distinct opportunity to conduct policy-relevant research within 
the regime. In the case of UNEP, the issue of US ratification in relation to creating a 
World Environment Organisation (WEO) is a fundamental, but overlooked, issue. The 
Rio+20 UN conference in 2012 provided a unique and rare opportunity to explore the 




 Fourth, while the findings are only directly applicable to the two regimes in 
question, the findings may have relevance more generally for environmental 
multilateralism. The conceptual framework and governance models presented in the 
thesis may have some application beyond issues of a specifically environmental nature, 
but it would be erroneous to assume this given the difference in problem characteristics 
between issues such as climate and biodiversity or, more markedly, climate and trade (this 
justification will be further developed and discussed in Chapter VII). 
The focus of the chapters in this thesis has been guided by the agenda setting and 
calls for academic engagement by different groups, particularly the Earth Systems 
Governance (ESG) Project.  For example, the need to move towards forms of majority 
voting (Biermann et al. 2012; Biermann and Gupta 2011;  2012) and a WEO (Biermann 
et al. 2012;   2012) have been previously highlighted as potential key reforms for 
improving ESG. This thesis examines both the upgrade of UNEP (Chapter III) and voting 
models (Chapter IV) in relation to US ratification and participation. Thus, the research 
and the thesis have been shaped to address topical issues identified by the ESG Project 
and others, and with the interest of maintaining academic and policy relevance whilst 
exploring the thesis questions.   
 
1.6 Thesis Outline  
This is a thesis by publication and consequently most of the chapters comprising the 
body of the thesis have been prepared for peer-review journal publication. The 
introduction, methodology (Chapter II), discussion (Chapter VII) and conclusion 
(Chapter VIII) are the exceptions to this, as they are instead part of the ‘context statement’ 




separate sections corresponding to the different levels identified in the second research 
question.   
 
1. Chapter III explores the politics behind changing the global institution of 
UNEP, and puts forward a number of options for UNEP to progress in form 
and function without the ratification and/or participation of the US. This 
article was published as a working paper with the Earth ESG (presented in this 
thesis as Chapter III), and presented as a conference paper at the ESG 2014 
Norwich Conference    
2. Chapter IV examines the possibility of majority voting within the UNFCCC 
by exploring the legal, political and institutional barriers and opportunities for 
change in decision-making processes. A key finding is that majority voting is 
both legally and politically possible and could enable a number of forms of 
critical mass governance (CMG) without countries such as the US. A version 
of this paper has been published as a peer-reviewed discussion paper with the 
Frei Universitat Berlin (see Appendix II), and presented as a conference paper 
at the 2014 ESG Norwich conference. The final version was published as a 
peer-reviewed article with the international journal International 
Environmental Agreements (presented in this thesis as Chapter IV). 
3. Chapter V explores how a 2015 climate treaty could effectively operate with 
US legal participation. This is done by varying treaty structure and content to 
allow for US participation through presidential-executive agreements. This 
paper has been published as a peer-reviewed article with the international 




4. Chapter VI addresses the opposite scenario by investigating how a 2015 
climate treaty could operate effectively without US ratification. A suite of 
measures including the incorporation of subnational actors in the US and both 
facilitative and punitive non-party measures are highlighted and combined to 
suggest different models for dealing with US non-participation in a future 
climate agreement. This paper is in peer review with the international journal 
Climate Policy (submitted draft presented in this thesis as Chapter VI).  
 
Each chapter is preceded by a short preface outlining the contribution of the 
research findings to the overall thesis and argument. The discussion chapter (Chapter VII) 
brings together the findings of each chapter and synthesises them into two different 
models for governing environmental issues without US ratification and/or participation. 
This is then used as a basis for the construction of a conceptual framework for visualising 
how a transformation towards these governance structures could occur. The results are 
then placed in the context of the two framing debates explored previously.  A version of 
the discussion chapter has been accepted for presentation as a conference paper at the 
2015 ESG Canberra conference. Following the discussion, a brief conclusion reviews the 
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Chapter II:  Methodology and Methods:  Theoretical Eclecticism and a 
Systems Approach 
 
2.1 Overview  
 The methodology detailed in this chapter provides a common thread throughout 
this thesis. It is a fusion of different tools from systems dynamics, international relations 
theories and the study of political feasibility, applied specifically to case studies under the 
thesis research questions.    
 
2.2 Methods  
 This thesis relies upon the review of the relevant literature and a mixture of semi-
structured interviews, participant observation and document analysis (such as party 
submissions) to generate empirical data. Data from interviews and participant observation 
were gathered through a number of fieldwork segments. Fieldwork was conducted at the 
Rio+20 summit in Rio de Janeiro (June, 2012), COP18 in Doha (November, 2012), 
COP19 in Warsaw (November 2013) as well as a number of smaller meetings under the 
UNFCCC, including a board meeting of the Green Climate Fund (Berlin, March, 2013), 
an ADP session (Bonn, May, 2013) and a UNFCCC subsidiary bodies meeting (Bonn, 
June, 2013).  Semi-structured interviews provide a large degree of flexibility, allowing 
interviewers to skip questions, dwell upon others and engage in dialogue (Bailey 2007). 
This was important, given that the topics of the thesis articles are exploratory and there 
needed to be the space to follow various areas of interest. Sampling for the interviews 
was done via purposeful sampling and ‘snow-balling’ techniques (Patton 1990). 




diplomats who were familiar with the topic being addressed within the article. Key 
respondents were identified before negotiations and generally contacted via email before 
being approached in person. These interviews usually led to further relevant contacts in a 
snowball effect. Interviewees were given the choice of being identified or remaining 
anonymous, with anonymity being the default option when no option was selected on the 
consent form or specified verbally. All interviewees chose to maintain their anonymity. 
Within each article, the number of interviewees is specified as well as their profession 
(NGO, negotiator, ambassador or academic) and background (their region of origin or, 
for negotiators, the region they are representing). Thus, their relevance is highlighted 
without compromising their identity. Further details for interviews are included in the 
relevant articles. Further information on the compiled interview information and consent 
forms are in Appendix A. All of the interviews were conducted under, and in accordance 
with, approved ethical research protocols through ANU Office of Research Integrity. 
 
2.3 International Relations and Theoretical Eclecticism 
 Despite possessing a transdisciplinary scope, this thesis is primarily located in the 
field of international relations. International relations has traditionally been dominated by 
the positivist theories of liberalism and realism, along with their more recent ‘neo’ 
variations and the post-positivist theory of constructivism. For international relations 
scholars, neorealism with its focus on structural anarchy has been the foremost choice, 
but neoliberal institutionalism has been the primary lens for most studying international 
environmental regimes (Vogler 2010: 2681). This thesis does not frame itself solely 
within one of these approaches; instead, it intentionally blends insights from each to 
create a theoretical eclecticism. This is sensible given that theories have differing 




example, Brunee points out that constructivism is much more useful in explaining the 
actions of the EU within the climate regime, while realism proves to be more appropriate 
for the US (Brunnee 2008: 5).  In this thesis, different features from constructivism, 
neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism are combined in a range of manners within 
both the individual articles and in the discussion (Chapters VII and VIII). Nation states 
are taken as the main actor for analysis throughout the thesis. Scholars from a variety of 
fields assert that, despite the rise of non-state actors and networks, states are still the 
primary unit of the international system and are central to combating environmental 
change (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004). The continued primacy of nation states is due 
to a number of reasons, including their role in catalysing policies, technology and new 
markets (Jänicke and Jacob 2004). Moreover, they are the base units that comprise 
intergovernmental institutions and negotiations. For example, the climate regime is the 
main area of focus for this thesis, and the UNFCCC, as focal point of the regime (Dai 
2012: 623), only has nation states as parties with distinct decision-making powers. The 
analysis conducted in the majority of this thesis is realist in the sense of making states, 
particularly the US, a point of focus in most of the analysis. 
However, this thesis deviates significantly from the neorealist school of thought 
in its appreciation of international institutions. Neorealists view international institutions 
and organisations as epiphenomenal: they simply codify the interests of powerful states 
and have little autonomy from, or influence over, them (Dai 2012: 624). In contrast, 
neoliberal institutionalism stresses the importance of international institutions, even for 
great powers, in decreasing both transaction costs and uncertainty, as well as making state 
behaviour more predictable (Keohane 1998). States can be thought of as profit-
maximising entities that require international institutions to deal with the problems, and 




thesis looks at different institutional reforms, including decision-making and treaty 
design, to enable governance without US ratification and/or participation. Accordingly, 
it shares the neoliberal institutionalist perspective that international institutions are not 
epiphenomenal; institutions have a life of their own and can significantly alter and shape 
the preferences and actions of states (Milner and Waltz 1999: 56). This thesis also 
maintains an element of neoliberal institutionalism by focusing on output legitimacy, 
rather than input legitimacy as constructivism would (Eckersley 2007: 307). Output 
legitimacy, or effectiveness, is put forward here as a combination of the ability of an 
institution to produce outcomes (referred to as ‘output’: accepted rules, norms, principles, 
laws and operational agreements) and, more importantly, the ability of a regime to address 
the underlying collective action problem (‘impact’) (Underdal 1992; Easton 1965). This 
is reasonable, given that the legitimacy of international environmental cooperation is 
more likely to be undermined by a lack of results then procedural fairness, with the 
UNFCCC being one clear example of this (Vihma 2011: 7). Another influence from 
neoliberal institutionalism is seen in the perception of the nature of states. In a moderate 
neoliberal sense, states are seen as actors that often seek absolute gains, but will rarely 
pursue an absolute gain if it leads to a relative loss of power in relation to an adversary or 
competitor (Milner and Waltz 1999). Constructivism does not play a central role in the 
individual articles of the thesis. While discourses and normative dimensions are 
occasionally incorporated into the analysis (for example, see the ‘barriers’ section of 
Chapter IV), the focus is more firmly placed on institutional and legal features, as well as 
power politics. Yet, the lens of constructivism plays a much more significant role in 
constructing the conceptual framework and theory of this thesis within the discussion.  
The final analysis and conceptual framework of this thesis, embodied in the 




Barkin (2003) highlights that despite the general view that neorealism and constructivism 
are in direct opposition to one another, the core tenets of both theories are actually 
mutually compatible. Neorealism and constructivism, with their focuses on power and 
structure, and norms, respectively, are actually complementary (Hunt 2001). Realist 
constructivism aims to examine ‘the way in which power structures affect patterns of 
normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which a particular 
set of norms affect power structures’ (Barkin 2003: 337).  The conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter VII explicitly pursues this idea, by exploring the interplay between 
the framing of environmental issues and the underlying international political power 
structure, and how the interaction between the two could shape the collective dynamics 
of state action in respect to climate change. This theoretical eclecticism is echoed in the 
general interdisciplinary approach of this thesis.   
 
2.4 Interdisciplinarity and Systems Dynamics  
 There is a general consensus on the need for integrative approaches that transcend 
disciplinary boundaries and create new knowledge and mutual understanding across 
different academic fields (Proust et al. 2012).  Scholars now contend that this is a general 
imperative within academia, particularly studies related to sustainable development 
(Newell et al. 2005). The need for a systemic understanding is necessary for both effective 
policy making and transitions to sustainability, where discipline-based, reductionist 
approaches are inadequate (Newell et al. 2005). This thesis provides an interdisciplinary 
approach through both a systems dynamics-based methodology and integration of a 
variety of tools from different fields. Each of the different articles and pieces of analysis 
does not attempt to use a single lens, but draws upon different fields, where relevant. The 




example, Chapter IV utilises both a legal analysis and insights from decision-making 
studies, while the discussion (Chapters VII and VIII) draws on ideas from economics, 
constructivism and sociology. Systems dynamics is used throughout the thesis and 
provides an interdisciplinary framing. This is a useful endeavour, since systems theory 
needs to be a cornerstone of any shared interdisciplinary language (Abraham et al. 1992). 
A governance system is a complex, adaptive system and, as such, requires a 
holistic systems approach. System dynamics relies on the ontological premise that 
systems are interconnected entities comprised of feedback loops, delays and non-linear 
changes, and that the observed human behaviour arises from the underlying system 
structure (Meadows 1989). Causal loops are prevalent in systems and lead to systems 
behaviour, whereby the effects of change in a system either act to amplify (positive 
feedback) or stifle (negative feedback) the original change. Newell et al (2008) therefore 
outline the key elements of a systems approach as a) examining the underlying causal 
structure of a system, b) investigating the feedback mechanisms and the behaviour it 
creates and c) identifying leverage points and places for intervention to create positive 
change and a new system state.  A systems approach based upon the examination of 
feedback and causal loops is both appropriate and useful in discerning reforms that can 
enable environmental governance that better manages US participation.  
Causal loop diagrams are one way of visually depicting and analysing feedback 
behaviour and crafting systems interventions, and are the core of the methodology of this 
thesis. Causal loop analysis has been used for a plethora of issues including obesity 
(Newell et al. 2008), urban planning (Proust et al. 2012) and international relations (Jervis 
1979, 1991; Gause Iii 1999). However, the coverage within international relations, 
besides the few aforementioned studies, has been scarce. Causal loop analysis has rarely 




analysis a novel methodological contribution for the thesis. Newell et al (2008) observe 
that there is a range of practised systems analysis tools, including influence diagrams, 
causal loop diagrams and complex modelling techniques. Causal loop diagrams were 
selected for this thesis since, unlike influence diagrams, they can account for the 
important aspect of systems feedback.  However, given the qualitative nature of data 
involved within the different case studies, it was not appropriate to attempt to quantify 
variables and create a full simulation or model. Both causal loop and influence diagrams 
provide a suitable method to describe the system, by capturing and combining different 
perceptions of cause and effect (Proust and Newell 2010). A system, in this sense, is not 
necessarily an objective phenomena, but mainly a conceptual device used to make sense 
of, and interpret, the world (Checkland 1985). The aim of the research within this thesis 
is not then to provide a completely objective and accurate depiction of the system (which 
would ultimately be impossible), but a synthesised, visual display of the perceptions that 
interviewees, and myself, have of the system in question. This was done by compiling 
collected empirical data from interviews, observations and literature, and then coding to 
generate a list of key themes and variables. With the system diagrams, variables are those 
parts of the system that can come in amounts or degrees that can change over time. Data 
is once again drawn upon to find the processes that link the different variables together 
in terms of cause and effect, then translated into a diagram. From there, I then attempted 
to discern possible causal loops and points of leverage in the system.  
 Within the diagrams in this thesis, the arrows denote processes, like a flow of 
causation or information, variables are boxed (primary) or unboxed groups of words and 
feedback is signified either by a + (indicating a positive feedback relationship) or – (a 
negative feedback relationship). A causal loop in these diagrams is simply when two 




diagrams, a balancing causal loop (a case of negative feedback constraining change) is 
shown as a circled ‘B’ (Figure 1).  A reinforcing feedback is illustrated as a circled ‘R’ 
(Figure 2).  These diagrams are based upon qualitative data and used to recognise what is 
driving or constraining possible institutional change. Once the basic feedback behaviour 
of a system is understood, different options for interventions into the system and points 








Alongside causal loops, systems archetypes and leverage points are also key 
aspects of systems dynamics. A systems archetype is a ‘common pattern of behaviour in 
organizations’ (Braun 2002).  They are isomorphic, underlying structures that often 
manifest in different institutions and organisations (Wolstenholme 2004). Archetypes 
allow for a greater, yet simplified, understanding of the system and therefore of the 
intended and unintended consequences of an intervention (Wolstenholme 2004; Braun 
2002). Numerous archetypes have been identified in the field of systems dynamics, and 
some of these are drawn upon in Chapters III and V.  Leverage points are also useful for 
understanding system structure and how to conduct interventions. Leverage points are 
areas where intervention can have a ripple effect and result in more widely spread 
Figure 1: Balancing Causal Loop 
Symbol 





changes. Leverage points generally tap into patterns of feedback so that small change can 
be amplified into more significant change (Meadows 2008). The ability to create great 
effects through only a small deployment of resources makes these points an important 
consideration of strategy and a common part of systems interventions (Olson and Raffanti 
2006).  Meadows (1999) provides a list of leverage points in a system that are ranked 
from the least to most powerful:  
Table 1: Leverage Points (Meadows 1999) 
Ranking Leverage Point 
1. The power to transcend paradigms. 
2. The mind-set or paradigm out of which the system—its goals, structure, rules, 
delays, parameters—arises. 
3. The goals of the system. 
4. The power to add, change, evolve, or self-organise system structure. 
5. The rules of the system. 
6. The structure of information ﬂows.  
7. The gain around driving positive feedback loops. 
8. The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the impacts they are trying to 
correct against.  
9. The lengths of delays, relative to the rate of system change. 
10. The structure of material stocks and ﬂows. 
11. The sizes of buffers and other stabilising stocks, relative to their ﬂows.  
12. Constants, parameters, and numbers. 
 
  
This thesis uses the notion of leverage points and Meadows’ ranking system to guide 
the topic of the different articles and proposed interventions.  Thus, the first article 
(Chapter III) looks at changing the overall structure of environmental governance 
(leverage point 4), the second and third articles (Chapters IV and V) examine decision-




design by making use of a number of different feedbacks to bypass US ratification (points 
4 and 7), and the end discussion (Chapter VII) puts forward an overarching argument on 
changing the existing paradigm of environmental, particularly climate, governance (point 
2). While these are leverage points for a change towards a multilateral model that can 
more effectively address US participation, it is not to say that they are easily implemented. 
In light of this, the methodology systematically considers the political feasibility of 
proposed reforms and interventions.   
 
2.4 Political Feasibility  
Analysing the political feasibility of proposed reforms is a core component of the 
thesis methodology. Political theorists generally agree that both desirability and 
feasibility are separate, yet equally important, categories when it comes to political design 
(Räikkä, 1998).  For although political science feasibility and desirability are relatively 
distinct, they should not be treated in isolation. If political arguments are to guide action 
or be implemented, then feasibility becomes a fundamental part of desirability. Simply 
put, structure or policy is not desirable if it cannot be implemented within the necessary 
period to address the problem at hand. Wiens (2012) highlights this dilemma by asserting 
that institutional design is composed of two distinct sets of problems: architectural 
problems and engineering problems. Thus far, the literature within international 
environmental governance and other fields of intuitional reform have been preoccupied 
with developing architecture. This is evident in the abundance of grand architectural ideas 
for environmental governance, such as a WEO (Biermann 2000) or the orchestration of 
climate governance (Abbott 2014). Empirical study of the politics underlying such 
institutional change is much scarcer, which is an unfortunate oversight. A house is of no 




contributing to some kind of greater structure. The key is for engineering to inform and 
provide the basis for architectural design in international governance. In this case, the 
political scientists become the engineers, and political systems, feasibility and constraints 
becomes the laws of physics that they must work with. Unfortunately, the job of political 
scientists is trickier as political systems and feasibility are infinitely more malleable than 
the laws of physics. This thesis attempts to provide one example of a study that covers 
both engineering and architecture by developing different environmental governance 
architectures for addressing US participation that are explicitly built on case studies that 
consider political feasibility.   
 Recent studies have brought forward important ideas that underpin political 
feasibility: concepts such as transition, accessibility and soft constraints. The feasibility 
of any institutional model relies upon its capacity to actually implement the necessary 
changes within an appropriate timeframe. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith echo this when 
stating, ‘Accessibility matters: there must be a way to bring the state of affairs about’ 
(2012: 811).  This engenders the need to develop a trajectory or pathway for the design.  
Soft constraints are factors that will shape the likelihood of any trajectory occurring, 
including economic, institutional, cultural and legal dimensions (Lawford-Smith, 2012). 
Analysing soft constraints and drivers and providing a reasoned, supported transitionary 
pathway are significant elements in justifying the accessibility and feasibility of any 
institutional design. This thesis attempts to combine causal loop analysis with the 
examination of soft constraints to detail politically feasible reforms and develop an 
understanding of the barriers and drivers that underpin their feasibility. Generally, the 
system (or intervention) and relevant literature is first detailed; soft constraints and drivers 
for change are then discerned through causal loop analysis; leverage points, interventions 




or scenarios are then examined in terms of political feasibility. This is the ideal application 
of the methodology, but due to differences in data and the problems being addressed, this 
approach varies across the thesis articles to some degree.   
 
2.5 Application of the Methods and Methodology  
 The use of the outlined hybrid methodology and accompanying methods is a 
common strand throughout this thesis, although there are some necessary deviations.  For 
example, while the first two articles (Chapters III and IV) make heavy use of empirical 
data from fieldwork, the latter two articles (Chapters V and VI) are much less reliant upon 
the data from interviews and observations. Chapter V, on weighted voting reform, was 
guided and catalysed by ideas from the interviews done for Chapter IV on majority voting. 
However, the majority of the analysis as well as the proposed weighted voting model 
were based more upon an expanded literature review and analysis of different voting 
schema, rather than the empirical data from fieldwork. Similarly, ten respondents were 
originally interviewed for Chapter VI, and while the empirical data was useful in 
informing me about elements of political feasibility, they were not central to the ideas and 
arguments put forward in the article. Thus, while empirical data was gathered for each of 
the different articles, it was in two cases used as more of a guiding source of 
supplementary information and not as a primary tool in examining the case study. Another 
point of differentiation is the use of scenarios: Chapters III, IV and IV make use of 
scenario building, but Chapter V does not.  This was done simply due to the broader and 
theoretical nature of the case study, and to allow for greater in-depth analysis of the 




Despite these differences in the application of the thesis, the methodology is 
generally a point of congruence for the different articles as well as the discussion chapter. 
All of the papers and the discussion utilise causal loop diagrams, with two of them also 
drawing upon relevant systems archetypes (a notion that will be explained in the 
appropriate sections). Critical appraisal of political feasibility is, once again, a method 
that is adhered to in every section of the thesis. Overall, the thesis methodology provides 
a key point of congruence between the articles and the end analysis, as well as a novel 
contribution to the field by employing systems dynamics tools in combination with the 
consideration of political feasibility. Chapter III – the first article – of this thesis provides 
one clear example of a relatively successful and complete application of the thesis 
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Foreword to Chapter III: Realpolitik and Reform  
 This first article addresses the thesis research questions by focusing on the reform 
of a global institution: UNEP. The reform of UNEP is explicitly and repeatedly connected 
to issues of existing geopolitics and US ratification. Indeed, what is termed as the ‘US 
ratification straitjacket’ (a term also mentioned in Chapter I) is the foremost obstacle to 
changing the form of UNEP and creating a WEO. The ratification straitjacket, alongside 
developing country preferences for a change in UNEPs function as the main driver of 
change, demonstrate that US ratification and multipolarity are the key underlying 
influences shaping the future of UNEP.  As the first article of the thesis, this establishes 
a justification for the choice of topic and direction of the thesis. US leadership and 
multipolarity are the main forces that shape UNEPs fate, and the possibility of a WEO, 
but have not received sustained coverage in academia or politics. Accordingly, the novel 
contribution of this article is also the main link it has to the overall thesis.  
 Chapter III has a number of similarities and differences, both in terms of themes 
and approach, with the other papers of this thesis.  Similar to the majority of the chapters, 
it makes use of causal loop analysis. The most distinct difference between this paper and 
the others is its focus. While the latter three articles of this thesis concentrate upon the 
climate regime, this piece centres its analysis upon UNEP. This provides a useful degree 
of institutional variety beyond the climate regime. It also allowed me to make use of the 
unique opportunity that Rio+20 offered as a case study. It is a summit that only occurs 
once a decade and was a pivotal moment when UNEP reform was transparently debated. 
Thus, the choice of this case study was logistical, but also done for purposes of diversity 
and fit to the second thesis research question.   
Two key lessons for the central thesis can be drawn from this paper. First, there is 




‘critical mass’ scenarios) or those which attempt to accommodate the US while 
maintaining a degree of effectiveness (UNEP Unknown and the ‘incremental upgrade’ 
scenario). This creates the foundation for the notion of CMG presented in the discussion. 
It also provides a basis for the core idea that there exists a choice between governance 
based on the structural leadership of a majority without US participation, or a more 
nuanced and decentralised way forward that allows for US participation (exclusive and 
inclusive of CMG, respectively). Thus the UNEP reform case study lays a theoretical 
platform for the successive articles and end argument of the thesis.   
 This article was published as a peer-reviewed working paper with the ESG Project 
and presented as a conference paper at the ESG 2014 Norwich Conference. The published 





























































































Foreword to Chapter IV: Framework for the Future  
 Chapter IV explores the implications of introducing majority voting into the 
UNFCCC and feasible ways of doing so. It addresses the thesis research questions by 
exploring governance without the US via decision-making change. This is emphasised as 
one method of allowing for multilateral decisions and actions without US consent. 
Notably, the US has also been historically a key barrier to introducing majority voting 
and is likely to continue to be so. Majority voting is intricately tied to the issue of US 
participation both in terms of the latter being a barrier to the former and the former being 
an effective coping mechanism for the latter.    
 The findings of this paper have a number of clear implications for the wider thesis.  
First, it provides a strong argument for the utility of majority voting as a practice but notes 
that, due to feasibility, the best way forward is the introduction of voting to new treaties 
and bodies under the UNFCCC. This is used as a core part of the article on managing US 
participation within the 2015 climate agreement (Chapter V). Second, this chapter 
outlines how the current decision-making paradigm undermines effective international 
environmental governance. Third, this article explicitly links the move away from 
consensus towards majority voting as a way to enable governance without the US. This 
section on CMG echoes the central ideas of this thesis presented in the discussion and 
conclusion.   
 It should be noted that voting has implications beyond US participation. The US 
has rarely directly blocked the adoption of agreements as it is successful at shaping them 
to reflect their interests. Voting provides a procedural enabler for semi-globalism and, 
importantly, for agreements to be designed without having the US use consensus 
procedures to water down their substance (as occurred with the Kyoto Protocol). As 




basis for more efficient and effective governance with US participation. Voting provides 
a way not only to deal with the US, but also a wider approach to deal with recalcitrant 
states generally and enable CMG. As highlighted in the paper, the political feasibility of 
this is for now questionable, but it nonetheless provides an important institutional 
opportunity.  
A version of this paper has been published as a peer-reviewed discussion paper 
with the Frei Universitat Berlin (see Appendix II) and presented as a conference paper at 
the 2014 ESG Norwich conference. The final version was published with the international 









































































Foreword to Chapter V:  Bypassing the Ratification Straitjacket  
 This article provides an overview of the issue of US ratification in relation to the 
2015 8  climate agreement and options to conduct an effective treaty with US legal 
participation. It directly addresses the research questions by examining how a future 
climate treaty could operate effectively with US legal participation. The paper outlines a 
number of tools that can be used to allow for US legal participation without Senate 
ratification, with an end model of CMG presented as an ideal solution. This provides the 
basis for a future discussion around CMG in the thesis discussion chapter (Chapter VII) 
and the presented model of inclusive CMG.  
 This article draws upon voting ideas presented in Chapter IV and the choice 
between US and non-US ratified governance that is established in Chapter III. It uses the 
same methods and methodology as the previous pieces, with a concentration upon 
feasibility and scenario building, but with notable deviations. Data was gathered for this 
article through 11 semi-structured interviews and observations at COP19 in Warsaw, 
November 2013. However, after coding and analysis it was found that while the data was 
useful in providing background knowledge of the existing politics, the actual ideas and 
proposals were mainly formulated from the literature review. Thus, interview quotes and 
references to negotiating observations are not used within the article, unlike Chapters III 
and IV, which heavily rely upon gathered empirical data. 
 In many ways this article is the crux of the thesis, as it embodies the CMG idea 
and provides a tangible model based on the findings of the previous articles.  It provides 
a template for how CMG can be implemented in the climate regime. Thus, it offers a 
8 It should be noted that this thesis was written and submitted prior to the 2015 Paris climate 
agreement.   
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potential, operational example of how environmental treaties can legally and 
institutionally function with US legal participation. This culminating model gives a basis 
to the move towards prescriptive theory in the discussion chapter (Chapter VII). The 
argument put forward for a legal treaty, and the assessment of existing non-binding 
‘pledge and review’ approaches, not only provides a platform for this paper but also 
makes an important contribution to the overall thesis. These sections provide a critique 
on current attempts to accommodate the US and bypass ratification and reject the 
assertions of bottom-up approaches.  In doing so, it engages with the second framing 
debate of this thesis.   
 This paper has been published with the international journal Climate Policy. The 






































































Foreword to Chapter VI: US-Proofing the Paris Climate Agreement 
 
 This paper explores how the Paris Climate Agreement, or alternative agreement, 
could effectively address a non-party US. It is complementary to Chapter V and covers 
the flipside of the US ratification conundrum. It explicitly addresses the thesis research 
questions by examining how a future climate treaty could, and how the Paris Climate 
Agreement would, function without US legal participation. The final model presented in 
this paper provides the foundation for the idea of ‘exclusive CMG’ outlined in the 
discussion (Chapter VII).  
 This article is similar to Chapter V but with a focus US non-participation. This is 
based on the scenario of a US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement due to 
change in executive (or Congress). It also deviates from Chapter V by making more 
explicit use of causal loop analysis and systems thinking. This provides a greater 
connection to Chapters III and VII. The close links to Chapter V are natural given that 
these were originally part of a single paper that was later split in two based on anonymous 
peer-review feedback. Thus it draws upon similar empirical data and ideas as Chapter V, 
but with a number of important differences such as the focus on non-party measures.  
 This paper makes an important contribution to the thesis by explicitly addressing 
research question 2 and exploring how a climate agreement could address a recalcitrant, 
non-party US. Moreover, it provides an important and timely dimension to the thesis as 
it was updated and published after the Paris Climate Agreement. It examines how the 
agreement addressed the US ratification straitjacket and the implications of a possible US 
withdrawal in the future.   























































































Chapter VII: Discussion  
 This discussion chapter brings together the different insights explored in this 
thesis to propose two alternative governance models, directly addressing the central 
research questions outlined in Chapter I. Both models of CMG are plurilateral approaches 
to managing US participation in environmental multilateralism. Inclusive CMG uses 
institutions and plurilateral treaties that allow for the US to contribute to leadership where 
they can. Exclusive CMG employs treaties and institutions that are designed to operate 
by coalitions of the willing that preclude US participation initially. These two CMG 
models are derived from a theoretical perspective focusing on system dynamics and 
feedback analysis. A conceptual framework for analysing how a transition to these 
different forms of governance can be achieved is constructed. The implications of both 
the CMG theory and conceptual framework are explored and the feasibility of each of the 
CMG models occurring is investigated. The chapter concludes with a brief analysis of 
what the theory and framework mean for the framing debates on participation in Chapter 
I. A version of this chapter has been accepted for presentation as a conference paper at 
the 2015 ESG Canberra conference 
 
7.1 Tying Together the Threads: A Choice between Two Governance Models for 
Addressing US Participation  
 A common thread throughout this thesis is that there is a fundamental choice for 
conducting environmental governance that addresses US participation: the system must 
either be constructed to allow US legal participation in the short term, or built to bypass 




to address US participation whilst maintain regime effectiveness: the governance model 
must be clearly designed to function either with the US, or without it. The first can be 
thought of as ‘inclusive CMG’ and the second as ‘exclusive CMG’. In relation to the 
second question on how to enable such governance models, it is clear that the enabling 
reforms at treaty, institutional, and decision-making levels depends on the desired 
strategy. An effort to construct a system that operates effectively with the US has different 
reforms in comparison to one that attempts to work without the US. There are two 
separate answers for each research question: inclusive CMG addresses effective 
international environmental governance with the US and exclusive CMG governance 
without the US.   
The first model is embodied in the UNEP Unknown scenario of Chapter III and 
the CMG model approach of Chapter V and has been termed inclusive CMG. For treaties, 
legal participation can be largely achieved through variable geometry, as argued in 
Chapter V and aided through the use of voting. For an institution like UNEP, it is either 
a matter of organisational reform to increase effectiveness without an alteration of form 
that would require ratification (UNEP Unknown) or waiting for US domestic 
circumstances to change (incremental upgrade).  
The second model is built on the Critical Mass WSDO from Chapter III, combined 
with both layered voting and the multi-level carbon budget treaty structure of Chapter VI. 
In contrast to the previous option, it will be termed as exclusive CMG. The name denotes 
a strategy that does not openly attempt to allow for US legal participation and is prepared 
for its exclusion. These different reforms share a rationale and are also synergistic. A 
2015 treaty operating under an exclusive CMG structure could easily engender a backlash 
by the US. Having an accompanying critical mass WEO would make the larger 




already not be reliant upon US funding. Combining the different reforms in this model 
constructs a more resilient approach by partially nullifying the possible negative feedback 
of US economic and political retaliatory measures. With this in mind, it is more 
appropriate to view the two different governance models as packages of connected 
institutional reforms enabling a specific multilateral approach, rather than simply two 
different sets of attitudes towards US participation. 
 This thesis has critiqued the existing modes of environmental multilateralism and, 
in doing so, has proposed that in order to address the issue of US ratification and 
participation there is a need for a paradigm shift. The shift is one away from global 
package deals based on consensual, interlinked negotiating and towards a more 
plurilateral method. Both are applicable to treaty design (the 2015 climate agreement) and 
high-level institutional reform (UNEP). This idea is an explicit and logical adaptation to 
a multipolar world that is not characterised by a clear hegemon.  
Semi-globalism is possible because the world is no longer reliant upon a single 
dominant actor, and thus success depends on instigating a critical mass of action across a 
constellation of actors. An inclusive CMG approach is viable, since the more fragmented 
architecture can accommodate a variety of interests (Sugiyama and Sinton 2005) and 
therefore a greater diversity within coalitions of the willing, across different issues. A 
change in international norms and decision-making rules is central to allowing 
environmental multilateralism to make use of multipolarity and in turn better cope with 
the conundrum of US participation.   
 The next section will provide a theoretical underpinning to both of these models 
of governance and an argument as to why they both could, in light of precedent and 
theory, function effectively. The common thread of initially having non-universal 




effectiveness can be drawn together under one coherent theory: a theory of CMG.   
  
7.2. A Theory and Analytical Framework of Critical Mass Governance  
The best way to address US participation (and make use of multipolarity) is to enable 
and encourage treaties and institutions to operate initially with a ‘critical mass’ of 
countries that will expand over time. This could be done in a decentralised fashion on 
specific issues (inclusive CMG) or as a strictly semi-global endeavour (exclusive CMG). 
The concept of a critical mass in socio-dynamics refers to a threshold number of adopters 
that, when reached, results in a legitimate and self-perpetuating form of collective action 
(Ball 2004). Notions of critical mass and the critical state were first identified in physical 
systems, but have been found in numerous complex systems including human ones, 
leading some to speculate that they are ‘ubiquitous’ phenomena (Buchanan 2001). This 
critical mass dynamic appears to be applicable to the realm of international politics and 
environmental multilateralism.  
While most current environmental treaties are working by a broad consensus style, 
historical precedents suggest that international cooperation often functions via a critical 
mass dynamic. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at its inception was a 
plurilateral coalition that was born from the failure of the International Trade 
Organisation, which exemplified an attempt at the global deal approach (Urpelainen 
2013). The original grouping of countries was a limited coalition of the willing which 




transforming into the World Trade Organization (WTO).9  The UN itself, as well as the 
most successful example of an environmental regime, the Montreal Protocol, took a 
similar path of broadening membership over time (Hoffmann 2012; Brenton 2013). The 
Montreal Protocol made use of substantial amendments over time to drive an increase in 
membership and strengthening of substance. Yet these institutions were created in a time 
of US hegemony, and all of them had the support and directional leadership of the US 
from the outset. Nevertheless, it is likely that the notion of CMG is just as suited to the 
new geopolitical conditions. Oliver et al (1985) demonstrate that the likelihood of 
achieving a critical mass is contingent upon the heterogeneity of a group. In the case of a 
multipolar world, the wide distribution of power is an advantage that results in a greater 
range of possible geometries and coalitions of the willing that could achieve a critical 
mass. The applicability of a critical mass approach under modern political conditions is 
evident in the abundance of recent proposals based on critical mass ideas (Urpelainen 
2013; Falkner et al. 2010; Sugiyama and Sinton 2005; Low 2001; Christoff 2006). 
A number of critical mass-type proposals have been put forward, particularly for the 
climate regime, but they have lacked connections or theoretical underpinnings. These 
proposals include the idea of taking a ‘building blocks’ approach to the negotiations 
(Falkner et al. 2010) as well as aiming to have a ‘big dream’ or goal that is preceded by 
numerous small wins (Urpelainen 2013). The central idea in both proposals is that small 
agreements and victories can showcase the virtues of cooperative action and build 
political momentum. Similarly, Sugiyama and Sinton (2005) advocate for an ‘orchestra 
of treaties’ where groups of countries with similar interests work together through 
9 It should be noted that the WTO is relatively exclusive and requires parties to apply to join, rather than 
being able to simply adopt it. This has made the approach of steadily growing in membership over time a 
natural trend.   
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plurilateral treaties on specific issues such as zero emissions technology. The rationale is 
that key coalitions can demonstrate ‘the technological and political feasibility of some 
climate policies’ (Sugiyama and Sinton 2005: 66) and entice others to join, resulting in 
expanding participation over time. Christoff (2006) argued that the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol should focus on building climate coalitions of the willing 
and compliance amongst them, rather than trying to re-engage the US. The rationale is 
resonant with other proposals: coalitions of the willing can showcase the benefits of 
cooperation and lead to ‘medium-term economic, social and ecological beneﬁts’ 
(Christoff 2006: 859). 
 Such critical mass ideas have been put forward not only for the climate regime, but 
for trade as well. Low (2001) has advocated for a form of ‘critical mass decision-making’ 
in the WTO, where smaller deals could be negotiated on the basis of majority voting. Low 
links the notion of critical mass dynamics with the use of voting, just as this thesis 
postulates that decision-making change can act as an enabler for CMG. However, there 
is a point of divergence with Low’s idea, as he suggests that such critical mass deals 
should start by consensus. This is a provision that could prove problematic, as any state 
could simply veto the adoption of any critical mass deal that might threaten their interests. 
Low’s analysis focuses only on decision-making in a single institutional context and, as 
with the other proposals, is not situated in a wider theoretical context. In this thesis, the 
integration of various CMG-based proposals with the insights into critical mass dynamics 
from international relations, sociology, constructivism and economics allows for the 






7.2.2 Critical Literature: Exploring the Critical Mass Idea across Different Fields  
The notion of critical mass change in political environments originated from the 
sociological study of collective action. Critical mass theory on collective action began in 
earnest with a series of articles by Oliver and Marwell during the 1980s (Oliver et al. 
1985; Oliver and Marwell 1988; Marwell et al. 1988), culminating in a book on the 
subject in 1993 (Marwell and Oliver 1993). Their central thesis is that collective social 
action usually requires only a small number of highly interested and resourced actors to 
take initial actions and cover start-up costs before other less concerned or resourceful 
members join and widespread collective action is induced (Marwell and Oliver 1993; 
Oliver et al. 1985). This is especially true in the case where costs decrease with increased 
contributions (an accelerating production function), thus lowering the incentive to free-
ride over time (Oliver et al. 1985: 547). Greater heterogeneity in the group (Marwell et 
al. 1988) and connectivity of actors (Oliver and Marwell 1988; Kim and Bearman 1997) 
increase the likelihood of the critical mass phenomenon occurring.  
Others have built upon this theory and expanded its basis and application. Macy (1990) 
reformulates the theory as a learning model whereby cooperation is moulded by social 
sanctions and responses, thus providing a constructivist twist on the original model, which 
was based on rational actors. He found within the learning models that the same 
phenomenon occurs, but the key in creating the critical mass is not the potentially low 
economic returns on start-up actions, but overcoming initial social costs and stigma 
(Macy 1990: 809). Despite these advances, the theory has mainly been applied to 
communications studies or in a piecemeal fashion (Oliver and Marwell 2001).  
The theory of the critical mass has not been applied in international relations or 
environmental politics. It provides clear economic and sociological underpinnings for a 




since the theory of collective action is not solely based on the domestic setting. The theory 
of the critical mass can reasonably be applied to state-based behaviour, which is logical 
given the existing notion of ‘bandwagoning’ within the field of international relations.    
The idea of bandwagoning within international relations is particularly pertinent to the 
concept of CMG, since it is based on nation states. It is a concept that has a long history 
in international relations, with ideas of contagion and ‘domino effects’ permeating 
diplomatic practice for decades (Schweller 1994). Bandwagoning was originally used in 
studies of alliance formation affiliated with the neorealist school of thought. Waltz (1986) 
originally referred to the twin opposing behaviours of balancing and bandwagoning. The 
traditional conception was that states either come together to balance power against a 
greater threat, or ally with the greater threat in order to avoid conflict (Walt 1987; 
Schweller 1994). Schweller argues that bandwagoning had been misrepresented and that 
‘the aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, 
while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted’ 
(1994: 74). Schweller puts forward a ‘balance of interests’ theory to explain the 
prominence of bandwagoning behaviour (1994: 100). This theory suggests that some 
states covet potential gain more than what they already possess and can be categorised 
according to these difference in desires.  
Schweller uses a typology of different animals to categorise states. Lions are great 
powers that are satisfied with the status quo and want to protect it, while wolves are 
revisionist states – great powers that want to see a change in the international system. 
Jackals are weaker10 states that prioritise the extension of their values over protecting 
10 ‘Weaker’ in this case means relative to great powers, not that these actors necessarily lack 
power in an absolute sense. 
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what they already possess, while lambs are weaker states that simply want to keep what 
they already have. Lambs and lions seek to maintain the status quo, while wolves and 
jackals desire change. Taking the case of World War II as an international example: the 
UK could be seen as a lion seeking to preserve the international order; Germany was a 
wolf that sought to change the status quo to its own ends through conquest; Italy and 
Japan were jackals who followed the lead of Germany; and states such as Australia or 
Belgium can be classified as lambs, whose predominant concern was maintaining their 
existing wealth and survival.    
All four of these classes engage in bandwagoning behaviour, and on this basis 
Schweller constructs a range of different bandwagoning scenarios: a domino effect 
happens due to an external force being spread throughout geographically or socially close 
states; ‘piling on’ occurs when the outcome of a situation or war has already been 
determined and states wish to earn a share of the spoils;  ‘jackal bandwagoning’ involves 
lesser powers who favour a status change following the leadership of a revisionist wolf; 
and ‘wave of the future’ bandwagoning occurs when states join a cause since they see it 
as an inevitable point of progress (1994: 92-99). All of these forms involve states acting 
out of a desire to profit. For Schweller, balancing and bandwagoning are driven by very 
different motives: the former is defensive in nature and the latter is fuelled by the desire 
to actively increase profit.  
Scholars have used bandwagoning to explain numerous behaviours, including the 
efforts of the EU to create common defence and security policy (Cladi and Locatelli 2012, 
2013) and the possible reaction of states to American unipolarity (Walt 2009). It has also 
developed a growing empirical basis. Sweeney and Fritz (2004) have demonstrated that, 




balancing behaviour. Accordingly, bandwagoning, as a common dynamic amongst states, 
has been repeatedly observed, studied, and explained theoretically. 
Bandwagoning is essentially the same as the critical mass phenomenon: once a certain 
threshold of power is reached, others will gravitate towards the expanding sphere of 
influence. While the theory of the critical mass justified this behaviour primarily on the 
basis of decreasing costs (socially or economically), bandwagoning explains it as an 
interest-based phenomenon driven either by security concerns (Walt’s formulation) or the 
expectation of profit (Schweller’s formulation). Like the theory of the critical mass, 
bandwagoning studies have overlooked the realm of environmental multilateralism and 
instead remained largely focused on conflict and security. On the few occasions when the 
idea of bandwagoning has been drawn upon within the field of environmental politics, it 
has been focused on how different issues can attach themselves to (bandwagon onto) the 
climate regime in order to create greater relevance and resources (Jinnah 2011; Conliffe 
2011; Wapner 2011), or how the climate justice discourse could do the same, by 
bandwagoning onto the already established human rights regime (Nicholson and Chong 
2011). This application is more of an example of strategic linking rather than an 
exploration of bandwagoning behaviour between nation state actors. Bandwagoning 
studies are not the only field of research from international relations that has drawn upon 
the critical mass phenomenon.   
The idea of ‘norm cascades’ within international institutions is an example of an 
international relations theory that describes a critical mass dynamic and has been applied 
to environmental issues. Norms are generally defined as socially accepted forms of 
appropriate behaviour for actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891; Katzenstein 1996). 
The notion of norm cascades revolves around explaining how norms form and spread 




state interests are socialised and not predetermined; the interests of states are largely 
shaped by the cultural environment (Wendt 1992; Klotz 1995). In their theory of a norm 
life cycle, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) posit that norms are created by norm 
entrepreneurs (norm emergence) and spread like a contagion (norm cascade). Once a 
critical mass of actors recognise the norm as appropriate, it is accepted as taken for 
granted behaviour and legitimised (internalisation). The rationale for the norm cascade 
process varies, but is likely ‘a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance 
international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). Norm cascades and dynamics are essentially critical 
mass phenomena. Harrison has applied the norm life cycle model to the idea of liberal 
peace, finding that ‘liberal peace may begin to generate powerful socialisation effects 
once a critical mass of liberal democratic states has emerged in the international system’ 
(2004: 521). The ‘norm life cycle’ has also been successfully applied to international 
environmental governance. Hoffmann (2012) employed the norm life cycle framework to 
explain the spread of the norm of universal participation in environmental treaties. This 
norm was established in the Montreal Protocol negotiations and then transmitted to the 
UNFCCC. Norm cascades rationalise the critical mass behaviour of norms as a 
phenomena driven by peer pressure.   
Norm cascades, bandwagoning and the theory of the critical mass all examine critical 
mass behaviour amongst large groups of actors, and explain it on the basis of perceived 
political, social and economic costs and benefits. A second characteristic that unifies these 
disparate theories and previously mentioned critical mass proposals is a belief in state 
actions being driven by feedbacks. Critical mass behaviour is, at heart, a phenomenon of 





7.2.3 CMG: A Theory and Analytical Framework of Feedbacks and an Application to 
Climate Change  
The highlighted theories all rely on positive feedbacks that can create a critical mass 
dynamic. Schweller (1994) notes that while balancing behaviour is a form of negative 
feedback, bandwagoning is a positive feedback:  
‘Bandwagoning dynamics move the system in the direction of change. Like a ball rolling 
down an incline, initial success generates further success, not greater resistance. In the 
language of systems theory, bandwagoning is a form of positive feedback’ (1994: 92).  
Similarly, norm cascades can be seen as a positive feedback that amplifies change over 
time as the new norm spreads. A critical mass can create both a feeling of solidarity 
among a plurilateral group and political momentum for others to join. Indeed, Macy 
argues that solidarity is a consequence, but not an initial driver, of critical mass action 
(1990: 809). All of the critical mass proposals for the climate regime also rely on some 
notion of a positive feedback occurring: countries would see the virtues of cooperation 
and further action would ensue. All of the ideas from the different literature discussed 
here are examples of positive feedback: bandwagoning and previous critical mass 
proposals identify a political positive feedback, norm cascades an ethical one, and the 
theory of the critical mass an economic and social one.  
The operation of these feedbacks relies on the perceptions of costs and benefits. As 
Davenport (2006) argues, ‘A leader’s willingness to lead depends on its expected costs 
and benefits from an effective agreement, including the costs to manipulate other states’ 
preferences’. This view is, in turn, shaped by norms and issue framing (Wendt 1992; 
Freedman 2013). The cost-benefit calculation of the US and other states will rely upon 
underlying values and ideology, which in the case of the US is based on a belief in 




environmental problems, issue framing is acting as a negative feedback. The traditional 
framing of environmental issues has stressed the risk of free-riding, compliance costs and 
leakage rather than the benefits of regulation and first-mover advantages. Traditionally, 
environmental problems have been framed as ‘prisoner’s dilemmas’, where due to the 
cost-benefit ratio and uncertainty about the behaviour of others, individual defection 
becomes the rational strategy but not the collective optimum outcome. This prisoner’s 
dilemma framing has helped prevent the formulation of a critical mass dynamic. 
The prevalent framing of state action on environmental issues has been in terms of 
free-riding and high domestic costs. Many scholars have stressed the importance of wide 
participation in markets’ instruments and treaties due to two related fears: free-riding and 
leakage (Barrett 2003; Barrett and Stavins 2003; Aldy et al. 2003; Bodansky and Diringer 
2014a). However, these fears lack a strong empirical foundation and are not grounded in 
observed reality: it is a normative fear based on expectations rather than a proven fact. 
Framing determines which issues on the agenda are recognised and what norms and 
actions are mobilised (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Concerns over free-riding are the 
main negative feedback against plurilateral or unilateral environmental regulation and the 
primary argument against the notion of CMG in general.  
Free-riding is the concern that regulation will result in a loss of competitiveness for 
those who take strong actions. Free-rider non-acting states will not incur the cost of 
regulation yet will benefit from the collective actions of others. It is feared that this will 
undermine the intended environmental outcomes. For climate change, this is embodied in 
debates over carbon leakage. Yet the majority of studies of carbon leakage are ex-ante 
model-based simulations, have had mixed results and do little to support the claim that 
free-riding occurs in reality. In one of the few studies based on empirical observations, 




cement, steel or aluminium industries. Similarly, the fourth assessment report of the IPCC 
(2007) concluded that carbon leakage resulting from the Kyoto Protocol was negligible 
in an economy-wide sense. Most ex-ante modelling studies have estimated leakage rates 
of 5–20%, while ex-post econometric studies have not observed any statistically 
significant rate of carbon leakage (Branger and Quirion 2014).  
The argument for not acting because of the risk of free-riding is further undermined 
once positive externalities and spillovers such as technology and policy diffusion enter 
the discussion. Fullerton, Karney and Baylis (2011) argue that policies such as carbon 
taxes could even lead to positive forms of leakage that produce greater emissions 
reductions due to reactions by the market. Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) constructed an 
economic model to illustrate that with even moderate levels of international technology 
diffusion for renewable energy, carbon leakage becomes negative; the anticipated spread 
of new technologies is more powerful than the leakage of carbon between countries.  
Spillover effects and positive leakages are less frequently discussed but perhaps are of 
greater importance. A substantial amount of literature and evidence, particularly on 
climate change, suggests that actions by one country can easily produce positive 
externalities and lead to the diffusion of policies and technology (Busch et al. 2005; Tews 
et al. 2003; Ovodenko and Keohane 2012). Progressive action by some could catalyse 
virtuous behaviour in others and thus more than compensate for any potential free-riding 
effects (Bosetti and De Cian 2013). As shown in Chapter VI, this is particularly true of 
the US, where subnational action is often inspired by policies and ideas from other 
countries. There may also be substantial first-mover advantages in developing 
technologies and establishing industries and policies prior to a global market shift. 
Leakage-mitigating actions, such as carbon border tax adjustments, could also be 




argument that positive leakage and spillovers will have a greater impact than leakage and 
losses in competitiveness. As Biermann and Dingwerth (2004: 7) note, a large amount of 
empirical evidence suggests that an environmental ‘race to the top’ thesis may very well 
be more compelling than the conventional wisdom of a race to the bottom. Free-riding, 
leakage and competitiveness, despite their dominance in the environmental multilateral 
discourse, constitute a shared framing rather than a real, empirically verified 
phenomenon. The concept of free-riding as a negative feedback against unilateral or 
plurilateral action is normative, not economic. As it is normative, it can be changed, 
particularly when enough positive feedbacks exist.  
There are possible normative, political and economic positive feedbacks when it comes 
to multilateral state behaviour, although the strength and prevalence of these feedbacks 
will differ between issues. As CMG is a theory of feedbacks, a simple form of feedback 
analysis provides a suitable analytical framework. When approaching any international 
agreement, an analysis of the potential economic, political, institutional, normative and 
environmental feedbacks can be used to see whether these feedbacks are strong and tight 
enough to make a plurilateral approach viable. Table 1 summaries how these different 
considerations can be drawn into a single novel yet simple analytical framework for 
CMG. After each of the feedback areas has been examined, an informed estimation can 







How immediate and visible are the environmental 
impacts? 
Economic11 
How strong are the negative feedbacks of free-riding 
and leakage? How strong are the potential positive 
spillovers and opportunities for policy and technology 
diffusion?  Is this seen as a first-mover or free-rider 
issue? 
Political  
Is there the leadership of a lion and/or wolf? How do the 
other actors approach this issue?  
Institutional 
How does the institutional structure enable or constrain 
plurilateral approaches?  
Table 7.2: The CMG Analytical Framework 
 
For climate change, all of the necessary positive feedbacks to create more widely 
spread mitigation appear to exist. There are observed economic feedbacks in terms of 
diffusion, lowering renewable energy prices and first-mover advantages, and normative 
feedbacks have already been observed (Hoffmann 2012). The central issue is not how the 
positive feedbacks allow action to accelerate, but how to create the initial critical mass. 
Considering the large inequality in emissions and capacities (group heterogeneity) and 
11 Note that normative feedbacks are partially reflected in the economic evaluation, since the 
perception of costs and benefits is largely a matter of framing and norms. The idea of norm 
cascades has been omitted for now due to the difficulty in analysing this for different regimes in 
a comparable manner.  
 
                                                             
175 
 
close connectivity of actors through the UNFCCC, it appears that the climate regime has 
many of the characteristics that encourage the creation of critical mass action (Centola 
2013). The current lack of movement on climate mitigation demonstrates that the negative 
feedbacks are currently dominant and have prevented the creation of a critical mass 
dynamic. The dominance of the free-riding framing and related concerns can be seen both 
in domestic debates on climate policy (such as resistance to cap-and-trade regulation or 
the Byrd–Hagel Resolution in the US) and in behaviour such as conditional international 
targets.12 This framing is driving balancing behaviour between the major powers. It is a 
political negative feedback fuelled by a perceived economic one of free-riding and high 
costs. Arguably, once the critical mass dynamic begins, belief in the free-rider framing 
will be diminished as desirable positive feedbacks emerge. The next step is to explore 
how this initial resistance can be overcome, allowing positive feedbacks and the critical 
mass dynamic to develop. The conceptual framework outlined in the next section attempts 








12 One example of this would be the Australian 2020 emissions reductions targets, which offer a 
higher conditional target if the requirement of strong, coordinated global action is met.  
 
















Fig 7.1: A Conceptual Framework for CMG 
 
7.3 A Conceptual and Analytical Framework for CMG 
 
The conceptual framework for CMG presented in Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
interplay between state interests, power and the dominant normative framing of particular 
countries. It depicts how these factors lead to different group dynamics in terms of a 


























stalemate, ossification of the regime (Depledge 2006) or critical mass action. The 
framework is a combination of Schweller’s (1994) balance of interests and power 
categorisation of states (x-axis), and the normative framing of climate action (y-axis). It 
should be noted that the ‘first-mover’ framing in this case denotes not only a perception 
of first-mover advantages but also the broader domestic benefits of environmental 
regulation. This example of the conceptual framework is specifically applied to the major 
powers in the climate regime; state placement would need to be reconfigured for 
application to a different issue.  
The categorisation of states is based on both their general geopolitical interests 
and specific interests in relation to climate change mitigation. The US and EU are both 
western powers that have helped mould and want to maintain the current neoliberal 
international order; thus, they are placed to the far left of the x-axis. China and the other 
major emerging economies (South Africa, Brazil and India) have a much clearer interest 
in changing this broad international order and are placed on the opposite end of the axis. 
Ranking by power is then used to categorise countries into Schweller’s animal system. 
Data from the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) from the Correlates of 
War database has been used to rank countries in terms of their power.13 China, due to its 
high ranking in the CINC system, is classified as a wolf, and the US and EU as lions. The 
remaining BRICs are designated as jackals and less powerful developed countries as 
lambs.  
Placement on the y-axis has been determined based on both the strength of 
national mitigation efforts and country positions on the climate regime. Mitigation efforts 
were judged by the latest analysis from Climate Action Tracker of intended nationally 
13 See- http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities     
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determined contributions (INDCs) and national policies. 14  Country positions on the 
climate regime have been assessed through analysing their national and group 
submissions to the UNFCCC, specifically under Workstream I of the ADP on the 
structure of the 2015 agreement. Both of these assessments, as well as the assessment of 
power, are imperfect and relatively subjective judgements. The subjective and qualitative 
nature of this framework is a necessary one, given that the judgement of country efforts 
and power will always be a contest and by nature rely on subjective judgement. Effort, 
power and positions on international architecture cannot be clearly quantitatively 
expressed, but they can be accurately ranked by the mix of qualitative and quantitative 
measures outlined above.  
The position of the US is one that is quite clear regardless of the more subjective 
judgements inherent in the framework. The US is a lion, the strongest great power of the 
developed world. It is ranked second on the CINC and has a strong vested interest in 
maintaining the existing geopolitical order, which it crafted and benefits from. It values 
the protection of interests over self-extension and therefore lies towards the far left of the 
x-axis. It has been hesitant to take strong domestic action on climate change (its 
intentional NDC is significantly lower than the EU when based on a 1990 baseline), 
particularly due to concerns over loss of competitiveness, thus placing it lower on the y-
axis in the position of a moderate to strong free-rider framing.  
China is a revisionist wolf with an interest in challenging the political status quo, 
and has a dominant first-mover framing by a small margin. The remaining BRICs are 
jackals with a mixture of free-rider (India) and first-mover (Brazil) framings. The EU is 
close to being a lion, as it has an interest in maintaining the status quo to some degree, 
14 See- http://climateactiontracker.org/   
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but also has less structural power than the US. It does have the strongest first-mover 
framing of the different great powers due to its stronger domestic mitigation efforts. 
Australia and Canada are lambs that do not have a great deal of power and have primarily 
a defensive interest in a business-as-usual political order and an extreme free-riding 
framing.15 This conceptual framework provides an overview of the current geopolitical 
state of play in the climate regime. It illustrates the relative likelihood of different nation 
states engaging in bandwagoning and balancing behaviour. 
 The conceptual framework is distinguished by three different zones of structural 
behaviour. The upper third is the zone of critical mass movement, the middle is a 
stalemate where there is little regression or progression, and the bottom third is a zone of 
ossification where commitments and trust are likely to degrade over time. The centre of 
gravity reflects the midpoint of the current positions of the different major powers, and 
indicates the overall behavioural dynamic of the system at any given time. International 
climate policy is currently in a stalemate, characterised by a moderately dominant free-
rider framing. This centre of gravity idea is borrowed from Purvis and Stevenson (2010: 
17) who apply a similar emissions-weighted centre of gravity concept to their visual 
depiction of national negotiating positions on climate regime structure.   
Congruent with Grundig and Ward’s (2015) work on structural leadership, for a 
critical mass dynamic to occur the structural power of actors in the critical mass zone 
would have to be higher than those within the ossification area. The structural power of 
the leaders must trump the laggards, the position of leader or laggard being determined 
15 This is evident in the general regression of these countries in terms of climate mitigation 
efforts. For Australia, this includes the acts of the Abbott government in abolishing the 
Australian carbon tax. For Canada, this includes actions such as overshooting their first 
commitment period target under the Kyoto Protocol and subsequently dropping out of the Kyoto 
Protocol second commitment period. 
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by state’s normative views on the problem: are they concerned about free-riding and 
competitiveness, or do they pursue mitigation on the basis of domestic benefits and self-
interest in achieving first-mover advantages? In this conceptual framework (and as argued 
in this thesis), the US has an important role as a lion but does not have a veto over 
international action, nor is it necessary for the formulation of a critical mass. Given the 
placement of powers within this framework, there appear to be two main forms of CMG, 
both requiring a shift in norms by key states but differing in terms of the grouping and 
movement of actors.   
7.3.2 Bandwagoning Critical Mass:  
A bandwagoning critical mass occurs when one or two of the great powers take 
sufficient action to catalyse a semi-global alliance. The framework thus becomes 
unbalanced with a number of countries in the critical mass zone, while others remain 
significantly lower on the y-axis for a period. This transition is in line with the model of 
exclusive CMG. Given that the US has its ratification straitjacket and a dominant free-
rider framing, it is not capable of demonstrating such drastic leadership. Leadership 
would fall to either the possible lion of the EU or the wolf that is China. If led by China, 
this is most similar to Schweller’s notion of jackal bandwagoning (1994: 93), whereby 
the actions of a powerful revisionist state (a wolf), or a coalition, attract the wider support 
of opportunistic jackals looking to profit and to enhance their placement in the 
international order. Mitigation efforts are seen as a way of competing economically 
through first-mover advantages and politically and normatively pressuring others or, 
perhaps more likely, for domestic benefits. A bandwagoning critical mass led by the EU 
would more likely be a form of ‘wave of the future’ (Schweller 1994: 96), whereby states 
align with those undertaking progressive measures, since they see the shift as an 
inevitable transition to decarbonisation. Jackal bandwagoning occurs with Chinese 




geopolitical opportunity. European leadership generates a wave of the future dynamic as 
they are more likely to guard the existing geopolitical order and thus not appeal to the 
profit motive of the jackals. They also lack the political power of China and are more 
likely to rely on economic feedbacks to catalyse critical mass action. Arguably, this has 
already occurred to some extent. Extensive solar feed-in tariffs by Germany and other EU 
members since 2007 have drastically lowered the global price of solar photovoltaics, 
leading to widespread adoption globally, particularly in China. Whether led by the EU or 
China, or both, the bandwagoning effect is driven by the allure of political and economic 
advantage.   
7.3.3 Balanced Critical Mass:  
A balanced critical mass refers to a transition that is not driven by a revisionist 
state, or even a status quo lion, but a gradual movement of all states towards a critical 
mass approach, hence the notion of ‘balance’. This scenario is congruent with the 
governance model of inclusive CMG, as the US is not left behind but gradually moves 
with the other states along the spectrum. In this case, the geopolitical order is not 
threatened; the change is driven by the experience of different countries taking action on 
separate issues, and not by a revisionist power. The gradual recognition of the virtues of 
mitigation and cooperation leads to a shift in the normative framing and general 
movement of most countries upwards on the y-axis. Once the norm cascade is complete, 
enough countries have entered the critical mass zone to generate effective action.   
7.4 Political Implications  
 A key insight from the conceptual framework in Figure 7.1 (borrowed from 
Schweller’s work) is that for a critical mass dynamic to occur within the climate regime, 
the leadership of either a wolf or a lion is needed. The US, China or potentially the EU 




All of these countries face large domestic obstacles to forging ahead on climate change. 
This is particularly true for the US and China. The conundrum of the two true great 
powers is summarised by former German environment minister Norbert Röttgen who 
lamented in the aftermath of Copenhagen that ‘America is willing but unable; China is 
able but not willing’ (Purvis and Stevenson 2010: 15). The focus of this thesis has been 
institutional reforms that can enable CMG – environmental governance that addresses US 
participation – but it is still worthwhile to briefly analyse the political situation of each of 
these key countries. This section will detail the barriers to and drivers for each of these 
great powers providing leadership on climate change. 
 
7.4.2 The EU: 
 The EU is the most likely powerful international actor to attempt to provide 
leadership through concerted semi-global coalitions. As a bloc, they are a great power 
with a distinct self-image as a ‘green leader’, as well as vested economic interests in terms 
of renewable energy and green technologies (Eckersley 2004: 102). Moreover, their 
recent climate and energy packages represent the most progressive targets by any 
developed country. The package commits the EU to reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions of at least 40% on 1990 levels by 2030 and near carbon neutrality by 2050. 
However, it is questionable whether the EU has the necessary structural power, or social 
capital, to catalyse a critical mass. The EU has previously utilised coalitions within the 
climate negotiations to some positive effect. For example, they aligned with both Alliance of Small Island States and the least-developed countries at COP17 to oppose India and 
others in creating the ADP and ensuring that the 2015 agreement would include an 
‘outcome with legal force’ (Bodansky and Diringer 2014b). But their alliances have often 




led Umbrella Group (the US, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Norway, Japan, the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) or the China-led like-minded developing 
countries (e.g. China, India, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and Bolivia). As seen by the events of the Copenhagen climate summit, where it was 
effectively side-lined in the final negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord (Dimitrov 2010; 
Purvis and Stevenson 2010), the EU may simply lack the power to lead a critical mass. 
In any case, domestic targets may not be enough unless they are backed with other 
measures such as the threat of carbon border tax adjustments, a provision that has been 
discussed but not implemented by the EU. 
7.4.3 China:  
China has both the motivation and capability to provide leadership when it comes 
to environmental transformations, but it also suffers from a number of constraints. China 
has some of the most progressive renewable energy and carbon mitigation policies of any 
developing country. It already has put in place seven different regional and provincial 
carbon markets and has made plans for implementing a national cap-and-trade system 
(Jotzo and Löschel 2014). China has now announced that this national emissions trading 
scheme will come into place in 2017, making it the largest carbon market in the world. A 
bilateral deal in 2014 has also committed them to peak their national emissions by 2030 
(Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy 
Cooperation  2014), although they are likely to peak their emissions well before then 
(Kemp 2015: 16). The rationale for this domestic decarbonisation is complex, but is 
primarily driven by the pursuit of co-benefits such as alleviating air pollution, increasing 
productivity and gaining first-mover advantages in the renewable energy sector (Teng 




China has a clear interest in domestic political stability, an issue that is tested by 
the twin concerns of economic growth and air pollution. Both of these can be addressed 
to some extent through decarbonisation. However, China’s positions in the climate 
negotiations have been less productive. It has consistently opposed taking any legally 
binding international targets (Bodansky and Diringer 2014b) and routinely refused 
stronger measures on the reporting, monitoring and verification of emissions. Stalley 
(2013) argues that China’s foreign policy on climate change is dictated by principles and 
norms, particularly a belief in equity and historical responsibility, rather than a rational 
desire to challenge the US or take a leadership role internationally. The gulf between 
Chinese domestic and international actions is striking, and may not be bridged in the near 
future. Chinese leadership is distinctly unlikely unless this gap is traversed and China 
accelerates its domestic mitigation measures. 
7.4.4 The US: 
The US is likely to stay firmly within its ratification straitjacket for the foreseeable 
future, but in the longer term a different role is not implausible. There is the possibility 
of reactive engagement; i.e., renewed activity both domestically and internationally in 
order to compete with policy movement by the EU and/or China. Many have forecast a 
revival in US domestic climate policies and eventual re-engagement with the climate 
regime (Selin and VanDeveer 2007; Selin and VanDeveer 2011; Christoff 2006). These 
predictions have largely not come to fruition since the problems of the US are structural 
in nature. Despite changes in the approaches of different presidents, US environmental 
foreign policy has been characterised more by consistency than fluctuation (Patton 1990).  
That being said, the Obama administration has put into place a number of 
significant policies, including recent regulations of state electricity generators and 




by 26–28% by 2025 on 2005 levels (Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Joint Announcement on 
Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation  2014). However, this translates to only 
a 12–19% reduction when using a 1990 baseline and there is no mention of how these 
targets will be met. It also appears that Obama is reaching the ceiling of actions he can 
take without Congressional or Senate approval. The 2014 US pledge to the Green Climate 
Fund and fulfilment of commitments under the bilateral agreement with China will 
require Congressional approval of funds for the former or policies for the latter. This 
appears unlikely, given the Republican majority in the House of Representatives and 
Senate in late 2014. Given the nature of the ratification straitjacket, and the US political 
system in general, true directional leadership cannot occur until Congress support a 
proactive executive. Bilateral agreements with China can at least act as a powerful 
discursive tool in the interim. The excuse that the major powers are not taking mitigation 
action now appears less credible, and undermines arguments about free-riding and 
competitiveness concerns. Despite these steps forward, the US appears to be incapable of 
taking the role of a leading lion for a critical mass. 
There are a number of rational reasons why the US should pursue a leadership 
role when it comes to global environmental problems, particularly climate change. 
Naturally, the management of global ecological crises would help to minimise the 
economic costs and security implications associated with the impacts of climate change. 
However, there are also lesser-known benefits in terms of geopolitics. Ikenberry (2008) 
argues it is now an inevitability that China will outgrow the US in terms of hard power, 
but the US can maintain some form of ascendency, and a stable international order, by 
enmeshing China and others into the international liberal framework it has created. That 
framework is one built on democratic multilateralism and transparent international 




refused to institutionally enmesh itself with the multilateral forums they have built 
(Terhalle and Depledge 2013), a trend that is particularly true of environmental 
institutions (Brunnee 2008). There is no sign of this significantly changing, hence the 
focus of this thesis. It is a long road to US ratification, and a much longer one to US 
environmental leadership.  
 None of the existing lions or wolves of the international order appear likely to lead 
a critical mass within environmental regimes: China, for now, is unwilling; the US is 
incapable; and the EU may simply lack the necessary power. The most likely catalyst for 
mobilising a critical mass would be an alliance between China and the EU, as it would 
help allay initial fears over leakage and free-riding. Joint leadership between the two 
could be enabled through a compromise based on consumption-based accounting (which 
is very much in the interests of China) and strong mitigation action coupled with common 
border tax adjustments (which is in the interests of, and has been used as a threat by, the 
EU). This is similar to the compromise to break the climate deadlock put forward by 
Grasso and Timmons (2014), who suggest a deal based on consumption accounting and 
equitable mitigation distribution struck under the minilateral Major Economies Forum. 
As outlined in Chapter VI, this may very well need to take place outside the UNFCCC, 
given the consensus requirement. However, it would preferably still take place under 
some multilateral institution with an underpinning in international law, in order to bolster 
confidence and legitimacy. Given the challenges faced by each great power, a form of 
shared leadership is a probable basis for building critical mass. Since the domestic will of 
any single great power is currently insufficient to create a critical mass, alternative paths 
for creating change are desirable. The clearest way of allowing for critical mass action, 

















The reform of international environmental institutions is one way to help spur a 
shift towards CMG that does not rely upon significant political change within major 
states. States do not act or formulate their interests within a domestic vacuum. Instead, 
their actions and interests are shaped by, and shape, their interactions with others, 
particularly through international institutions (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998). This thesis has concentrated upon how to feasibly address US participation 
through reforms at different institutional levels of multilateralism. Institutions play 
important roles in shaping the normative context that states operate within, as well as 
determining what actions and by whom are considered legitimate and legal. Accordingly, 
international institutions are key in creating the normative and legal conditions to both 
allow for and encourage CMG to occur.  The feedbacks outlined earlier are of little use if 
























critical mass action is not possible or legitimate under existing multilateral practices. As 
illustrated in Figure 7.2, the precedents and practice of treaties and decision-making affect 
both existing norms and the possibility of plurilateral action occurring. These are the 
institutional elements that are addressed through Chapters III, IV, V and VI, highlighting 
a number of important institutional reforms that can both allow for and drive CMG. By 
creating legal instruments and institutions that are functional without US membership, 
and implementing voting-based decision-making, the normative settings of 
multilateralism can change and semi-global environmental action can be legitimately 
encouraged.   
 Another important aspect shown within Figure 7.2 is the tension between the 
institutional changes needed to enable CMG and the existing institutional status quo. 
There is a zero sum game between the prevalence of a ‘free-rider’ and ‘first-mover’ 
framing, with an increase in the former decreasing the latter and vice versa. Both feed 
back to the likelihood of successful plurilateral action, with the first-mover framing 
increasing it and the free-rider decreasing it. These three variables – critical mass action 
and the two contrasting normative framings – exist in tension. Critical mass action 
generally will not occur within institutional settings based on a free-rider framing, as the 
two are mutually exclusive. Instead, a first-mover framing creates the institutional 
arrangements that allow for critical mass action to occur. Currently, the free-rider framing 
is clearly dominant and is reinforced through the dominant institutional setting that is 
based upon universal, global package deals and consensus decision-making. The 
decision-making, treaty design and institutional reforms put forward in this thesis provide 
one possible blueprint of how change in the bottom two variables could create the 
necessary feedbacks to change both the dominant normative and institutional setting and 















A central notion of CMG is that participation should not be prioritised in 
international governance arrangements, at least in the short term. Participation, not 
substance, is the most flexible and dynamic variable within international arrangements. 
It is much easier for a country (or group of countries) to ratify an agreement in the future 
than to attempt to negotiate a new agreement or attempt to modify the constitution and 
rules of an existing instrument. Moreover, increased participation within MEAs is highly 
likely if not inevitable. This argument is based upon the feedbacks that exist between 
environmental impacts, domestic responses and the need for international cooperation, as 
shown in Figure 7.3. If an agreement is not effective, then the impacts of the unalleviated 
environmental problem will become more salient over time. As the environmental 
condition worsens and begins to affect the health and well-being of domestic 
constituencies, they are likely to exert political pressure for mitigation (or conservation) 























actions and to vote for administrations that promise effective environmental action. For 
states that are not democratic, it would likely occur through civil disobedience and social 
unrest until the government takes action. Such action will likely involve multilateral 
engagement. Thus the original number of parties is likely to grow, purely due to the 
feedback that worsening environmental conditions exert upon domestic political systems. 
One could argue that countries that were unhappy with the original provisions may feel 
slighted and are unlikely to subsequently ratify it in the future. However, this would 
assume no change in administration over time and that a country would place perceived 
fairness above domestic pressures, both of which are unlikely.  
The actions of most states actors, including the US, are largely determined by 
domestic concerns and factors above all else, and their perception of costs and benefits 
are largely shaped by domestic actors (Falkner 2005; Davenport 2006). There is of course 
the distinct risk that such environmental feedbacks occur too late. By the time the 
environmental impacts are truly felt, tipping points have already been crossed. This is a 
legitimate argument, but is impossible to address in any conclusive manner without first 
knowing where tipping points and irreversible non-linear thresholds lie. This is largely 
unknown for the climate and most other environmental systems. Accordingly, waiting for 
environmental feedbacks to manifest is a risky strategy, but may be necessary if other 
feedbacks are not sufficient to catalyse action.  
 As highlighted in sections 7.2 and 7.3 (and in Chapter VI in relation to the US 
and subnational actors), there are numerous positive feedbacks in terms of norms, 
directional leadership and positive forms of leakage, which are likely to draw in more 
states and actors over time. Thus, if the critical mass is effective it will snowball over 
time, and if it is not effective it will still grow over time due to environmental feedbacks 




feedbacks are all capable of driving increasing participation, even for the US. Christoff 
(2006) observes that ‘ecological blow-back’ from climate impacts alongside increasingly 
volatile oil prices are two trends that could raise public consciousness about climate 
change within the US, and drive re-engagement with the UNFCCC: ‘As public opinion 
swings towards support for early action, some of the political, economic and social 
impediments to it may also begin to dissolve’ (Christoff 2006: 850). Participation should 
be seen as a dynamic variable and, as evident in the literature, the desire for initial 
universal participation is not necessarily logical or effective (Hoffmann 2012). Not only 
does the initial constellation of actors not need to be universal, but it does not necessarily 
need to include the US. Importantly, these different feedbacks all influence states who 
are not part of the initial critical mass and help to enmesh them. Technological and 
economic feedbacks are particularly adept at this. As noted previously, the forerunners of 
climate policy have lowered the cost of renewable energies and helped spread low-carbon 
technologies, both of which have encouraged action within traditionally laggard states. 
Accordingly, the actions of a critical mass can help facilitate domestic environmental 
action within the US. Multilateral action without the US can still be beneficial to the US 
domestically. This analysis has a number of important implications for both of the 
framing debates on participation put forward in Chapter I. 
 For the first framing debate of minilateralism vs. multilateralism (introduced in 
Chapter I), this thesis has provided a clear critique of minilateralism. But this is not to say 
that a simplification of numbers and movement away from universal participation is not 
useful or desirable. A reduction in party numbers and complexity can be a positive tool, 
but not if it continues to tie progress to the US, and other recalcitrant states, through 
consensus. The simplification of numbers should come not by limiting the focus to major 




Christoff (2006) previously recommended for the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, minilateralism 
is a broad umbrella approach that incorporates the coalition of the willing style of ‘climate 
clubs’(Falkner 2015a; Das 2015). As Falkner notes, ‘Clubs will be at their most effective 
when they are constructed as “coalitions of the willing”’ (2015b: 13). The theory, 
framework and models of CMG would further challenge the notion of minilateralism by 
contending that for any club to succeed in generating significant widespread action, the 
enabling feedbacks need to be in place and the leadership of a great power (either a wolf 
or a lion) is needed. The critical mass club would also need to be central to a legal regime, 
rather than a small part of it, or outside of it entirely. A norm cascade is unlikely to occur 
and bandwagoning and diffusion effects will be stifled if a minilateral club is not highly 
visible or legitimate. Minilateralism by a coalition of the willing can work, but it must 
abide by these important conditions if it is to create a critical mass dynamic.  
For the second framing debate of treaty design (introduced in Chapter I and 
explored in Chapters V and VI), this thesis suggests that narrow-but-deep agreements are 
preferable as long as they involve a great power and enable the appropriate feedbacks 
over time. While this may not always be possible, it would appear that in most cases a 
narrow-but-deep agreement is preferable to a broad-but-shallow arrangement. In the case 
of climate change, where strong positive feedbacks exist, the narrow-but-deep approach 
is preferable. This lies in stark contrast to the ‘applicable to all’ pledge and review 
approach that the negotiations are currently moving towards. The debate should be less 
about which configuration is more likely to succeed, and more about what details and 
conditions are needed to enable the feedbacks and framing that allow for narrow-but-deep 
agreements to succeed over time.  
A third and important consideration is whether the theory and framework of 




The short answer is yes, although there are some caveats. The focus on the US has been 
due to both its unique ratification straitjacket conditions and the generally perceived need 
for US leadership on environmental issues. However, as this thesis has claimed, the world 
is quickly moving towards multipolarity, and the requirement of US leadership, or 
consent, is declining. Some findings of this thesis are only applicable to the US. For 
example, structuring an agreement to allow for the use of presidential-executive 
agreement is an architectural reform that is specifically targeted towards the legal 
circumstances of the US. Splitting up a treaty to allow for presidential agreements may 
allow for more buy-in from others, but is generally less useful for other laggard states. 
However, the arguments on designing treaties for non-parties in Chapter VI, and the 
theory and framework of CMG, are applicable to other states aside from the US. A critical 
mass agreement that triggers the right feedbacks can just as effectively enmesh a non-
ratifying China, as it can the US. Thus, the model of inclusive CMG is only really relevant 
for the US, but exclusive CMG is appropriate for essentially any other non-cooperating 
actor(s). As long as the key requirements for a critical mass are met (leadership by a wolf 
or lion, strong substance enabling the necessary feedbacks), then a non-cooperating state, 
whether it is the US, China, India or Australia, will eventually be enmeshed into the 
agreement. While this approach is most likely to be useful for the US, given that 
historically they are the key laggard in environmental regimes, it is not confined to them.  
 
7.7 Limits and Lessons: A Brief Application to the Ozone, Biodiversity and 
Climate Regimes  
  
CMG as a model for multilateralism has some important limitations, especially 
when applied beyond the realm of environmental governance. First, the idea of 




environmental impacts. As illustrated in Figure 7.3, the delayed impacts of global 
environmental change are a crucial feedback that drives pressure from domestic 
constituencies for those outside the critical mass to re-engage with a regime. While 
increased detrimental biophysical and economic impacts from anthropogenic climate 
change are a certainty, the same cannot be said of trade or security regulations.  
There are also potential limitations when using the CMG framework in relation to 
some environmental issues beyond climate change. Climate change has a strong and 
salient economic component, while many other environmental issues do not. Domestic 
action leading to positive spillovers and trade-related measures being used to penalise 
laggard states are feasible responses in the climate change context. The same logic is 
unlikely to apply to environmental issues, which are innately more conservation based, 
with less of a direct economic dimension. For example, strong action by a coalition of 
states on domestic biodiversity conservation is less likely to have any strong, tangible 
spillovers in terms of technology or policies. It would be unlikely for states to implement 
trade-related measures since there are no direct leakage concerns related to biodiversity. 
The logic on which CMG relies is largely economic and it is therefore most applicable to 
issues with a strong economic dimension such as climate change or ozone depletion. This 
is not to say that the idea cannot be applied to other areas; however, the extension of the 
concept must be done carefully and in a manner that takes into account the particularities 
and context of each governance issue.   
 Both the conceptual and analytical frameworks can be used as an approximate 
guide to explain the success and failures of the critical mass approach. I will briefly apply 
these frameworks to the Montreal Protocol for ozone-depleting substance, the CBD and 




The Montreal Protocol has all of the necessary feedbacks to allow for a successful 
critical mass approach. The ozone negotiations had the directional leadership of the US 
(a lion) which viewed international regulation largely as a first-mover matter, primarily 
due to the interests of powerful American firms such as Dupont industries (Gareau 2010; 
Sunstein 2007; Maxwell and Briscoe 1997). This led to political feedbacks, as shown by 
the significant expansion of the regime’s regulations and participants between the 
Montreal Protocol in 1987 and the 1990 London Amendments. The increased action 
during the Montreal Protocol and subsequent London Amendments were also driven by 
the discovery of the ozone hole (Hoffmann 2012; Maxwell and Briscoe 1997), a clear 
example of the aforementioned environmental feedback at play. The development and 
spread of cost-effective chlorofluorocarbon replacements from the US to European 
industries (Maxwell and Briscoe 1997) is an example of technology diffusion and 
economic feedbacks. The ozone regime had all of the necessary feedbacks functioning 
and a balanced critical mass led by a lion. Importantly, it was also institutionally enabled 
through the use of three-quarters majority voting under the Montreal Protocol and an 
expanding norm and practice of semi-globalism. The use of substantial amendments to 
encourage the participation of new countries and strengthen the ambition of the 
agreement, as well as trade sanctions for ozone-depleting substances on non-parties to the 
agreement, provided clear institutional mechanisms to allow for an expanding and 
evolving agreement. 
The Montreal Protocol in particular has some important lessons for this thesis. 
First, an exclusive CMG approach is feasible, but it has only occurred with a leading US. 
Whether such an approach could or will succeed without the US is much more difficult 
to say. It is particularly challenging given that Montreal occurred in a time of US 




just succeed due to the political feedback triggered by US leadership. The Montreal 
Protocol would likely not have snowballed and succeeded had it not been for the concern 
caused by the ozone hole, the discovery of a cost-effective replacement or institutional 
features such as voting and non-party measures. Indeed, US leadership was driven by the 
environmental and economic feedbacks. In turn, the enabling institutional environment 
was likely an outcome of strong US leadership in designing the protocol. Montreal 
demonstrates that exclusive CMG is possible, but only when political leadership and the 
other necessary feedback mechanisms are in place. This could well happen with a leader 
other than the US, but thus far has not for a similar global environmental problem.  
In contrast, the CBD has lacked the characteristics and feedbacks necessary for 
successful critical mass action. The US has not ratified the Convention and neither the 
EU nor China have taken any strong directional leadership role. As the Convention 
centres on a conservation issue, it has generally been a free-rider game between 
developing and developed countries. The economic feedbacks are decidedly weak as the 
CBD is largely dependent upon funding flows and less upon profitable technology and 
policy innovations. While biodiversity conservation makes economic sense, the benefits 
are largely hidden and longer term (Balmford et al. 2002). Biodiversity offsetting 
mechanisms have become widespread, but are still relatively heterogeneous (Lapeyre et 
al. 2015) and do not offer the same kind of market potential and profit incentive as the 
market for chlorofluorocarbon replacements or renewable energy. Many of the 
environmental feedbacks of biodiversity loss are less salient than those due to climate 
change, because they are less visible and longer term in nature. Most ecosystems work 
by complex, non-linear dynamics that are not easily envisioned or translated to policy 
makers and the public (Wallington et al. 2005). The CBD has lacked the leadership of a 




reinforced through the use of default consensus decision-making and a related insistence 
upon universal membership in legal instruments.   
The Kyoto Protocol is not a clear case of success or failure, but an example of 
how semi-globalism can both fall short and trigger important feedbacks. Politically, 
Kyoto did not have the clear leadership of a lion. It did have the leadership of the EU, but 
whether the EU can be categorised as a lion is debatable. Moreover, the leadership of the 
EU, as discussed earlier, cannot be considered as directional. Their targets have always 
been on the lower bounds of scientific suggestions for mitigation. Furthermore, the US 
(rather than Europe) was the main shaper of the protocol. The compliance regime, 
flexibility mechanisms and accounting rules were primarily based on US interests and 
design. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, climate change does have the potential for 
strong economic feedbacks; however, the Kyoto Protocol lacked the necessary ambition 
to drive these feedbacks. Interestingly, the main cause of plummeting solar and renewable 
energy prices has been the actions of a few under Kyoto, primarily European countries 
such as Germany. Moreover, the world has seen the spread of policies such as emissions 
trading, which were legitimised under Kyoto. Kyoto lacked any clear institutional 
structures to allow for the graduation of developing countries to take on targets of their 
own, or to expand and strengthen the agreement such as through non-party measures. 
While the environmental feedbacks of climate change are more salient than biodiversity, 
they are still longer term in nature and not always easily distinguishable. Accordingly, 
the Kyoto Protocol presents an example of a semi-global agreement, but not of exclusive 
CMG. It lacked the substance, ambition and institutional provisions to constitute strong 
critical mass action. It was an agreement based on appealing to the US, rather than 
showcasing EU leadership. However, the moderate leadership shown by the EU and some 




renewable energy and encouraging policy diffusion and subnational action. The Kyoto 
Protocol is an example of both the promise of CMG and the risks of a semi-global 
approach that lacks ambition.  
These three case studies are summarised through the CMG analytical framework 
in Table 7.2. The success of the Montreal Protocol was contingent on tight, strong 
environmental and economic feedbacks combined with the leadership of a lion and an 
appropriate institutional infrastructure. In contrast, the biodiversity does not possess 
strong feedbacks or the leadership of a lion or wolf and has institutional provisions that 
make a fully plurilateral approach difficult. The Kyoto Protocol had some success due to 
moderate economic and political feedbacks, but was hampered by a lack of institutional 
enablers and weak environmental feedbacks; it ultimately required stronger leadership. 
 
Table 7.3: A CMG Analysis of the Montreal Protocol and Convention on Biological Diversity and Kyoto Protocol 
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the US.  
Verdict 
Ozone depletion is 
applicable to a CMG 
approach. The 
leadership of a lion 




feedbacks makes a 
plurilateral approach 
both effective and 
likely to grow over 
time. The leadership 
of the US combined 
with an enabling 
institution 
arrangements 
(majority voting and 
non-party punitive 
provisions) made 
such an approach 
Biodiversity loss is 
unlikely to be 
addressed through a 
CMG approach. 
Weak and delayed 
environmental and 
economic feedbacks 
combined with the 
lack of a leading lion 
or wolf means that a 
plurilateral approach 
is unlikely to gather 
members or gain in 
strength over time. 
Consensus decision-
making creates a 
procedural hurdle to 
such an approach in 
any case.  
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The conceptual framework and feedback analysis provided in this chapter 
illustrates one way of explaining why the critical mass approach has, and has not, worked 
in the past. In turn, this provides a useful tool for deciding when the critical mass approach 
could work in the future. Crucially, it demonstrates the importance of institutional 
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion: The Middle Path to Multilateralism? 
 
The Anthropocene is characterised by significant environmental changes and 
challenges. These coincide with great geopolitical shifts. In order for institutions to 
manage the former, they must adapt to and make use of the latter. The world must find 
innovative ways to manage environmental problems in the absence of leadership from the 
former US hegemon and make use of multipolarity. This thesis has addressed the question 
of how US ratification and/or participation in international environmental governance can 
be addressed at the level of international institutions, decision-making and operational 
legal instruments. Fundamentally, this is a question of how environmental governance 
and institutional architecture at different levels can address the problem of US 
participation and ratification. This is reflected in the two research questions posed in 
Chapter I:  
1. How US ratification and participation be effectively enabled within an effective 
international architecture for environmental governance?   
2. How can effective environmental governance without the US (or other 
recalcitrant states) be enabled through major international institutions, decision-making 
processes, and operational treaties?   
In answer to the first research question, US participation and ratification can be 
addressed through one of two governance models. The inclusive CMG model is a 
governance model that allows for US participation through presidential-executive 
agreements or bodies that do not require ratification (e.g. UNEP Unknown). The 
exclusive CMG model uses treaties and institutions that operate in a distinct semi-global 




plurilateralism and are designed to address US participation, one through encouraging it 
and the other through circumventing it. The first would require a balanced transition, 
while the second would require a bandwagoning dynamic led by either a wolf (China) or 
Lion (perhaps the EU). Both of these models necessitate a movement away from the 
current multilateral practice of universal participation and interlinked, consensus-based 
decision-making. 
Exploring the second research question has resulted in the proposal that a 
movement towards either inclusive or exclusive CMG can be institutionally enabled 
through switching to voting for decision-making and designing treaties and institutions 
that make use of numerous tools that address US participation. Chapter III examined this 
issue through the attempted reform of the major international institution of UNEP. It 
found that a WEO either needs to accommodate the interests of the BRICs to allow for 
critical mass membership without the US, or change its function to avoid the pitfall of US 
non-ratification while becoming more organisationally effective.  
Chapter IV analysed decision-making reform through the lens of the climate 
regime, concluding that the introduction of a form of layered voting is preferable, but has 
limited feasibility. The greatest potential lies in implementing voting through future 
treaties and bodies. In the context of the climate regime, this naturally led to a focus on 
the 2015 climate treaty. Chapters V and VI explored the different ways of creating an 
effective 2015 climate treaty with or without US legal participation. . 
Overall, as proposed in Chapter VII, there can likely be effective international 
environmental governance without US ratification or even participation. The key is to 
make use of positive feedbacks and institutional structures to enable a critical mass 




governance structures can be developed that are effective and allow for US participation 
without depending on it.   
Both the inclusive CMG and exclusive CMG models rely upon reform to fit the 
new geopolitical order, but they differ in political feasibility. Exclusive CMG would 
require a significant change in policy towards environmental leadership by both China 
and the EU. In the context of history, the existing literature and the current political 
zeitgeist, inclusive CMG would appears to be the more feasible way of addressing US 
ratification. The use of smart voting systems such as layered voting, critical mass treaties 
and a UNEP focused on implementation rather than a treaty-based WEO would be the 
key enablers for this to occur. A more nuanced approach that attempts to allow for the US 
to contribute to the structural leadership of pushers is likely to be more feasible than the 
radical notion of a group simply moving forward without the US at all.  
Overall, both models of CMG rely on the theory of CMG. The theory of CMG is 
the notion that progressive environmental actions can create economic, political and 
normative feedbacks that cause them to spread and increase cooperation over time. For 
such a critical mass dynamic to take place, the leadership of a great power, positive 
feedbacks and enabling institutional features such as smart voting systems are required. 
CMG is both a theory and framework underlying this thesis and can be differentiated into 
the inclusive and exclusive governance models that are suggested as models for managing 
US participation in international environmental governance.  
 
8.1 Thesis and Theory: Contributions to the Framing Debates  
This thesis has made a number of contributions both to the existing body of 




analysis presented here is the most detailed investigation of the issue of US ratification 
and participation in international environmental governance to date, addressing a 
fundamental lacuna in the literature. The theory of CMG provides a novel theoretical 
framing that encompasses a number of bodies of literature. It also provides a basis and 
justification for existing critical mass-type proposals in environmental governance. 
Alongside the conceptual framework for CMG, a new way of viewing the dynamics of 
international cooperation is established, which provides some explanatory power for the 
success and failure of previous treaties and lessons in terms of when a plurilateral 
approach is likely to work. The notion of CMG is a novel theory and framework that 
intimately links to, and attempts to partially answer, two of the most important debates 
within environmental governance literature. 
The theory and models of CMG both challenge and complement the notion of 
minilateralism. This thesis suggests that the core problem of environmental 
multilateralism is the current overall aim to reach universal, global package deals. The 
problem is the paradigm and geopolitics, not the participant numbers. The answer is not 
found in limiting agreement to a consensus amongst major polluters. This is particularly 
true since it would simply tie outcomes to the US once again. A form of minilateralism 
based on progressive coalitions of the willing is needed. But in contrast to most 
minilateral proposals, CMG relies on identifying and enabling positive international 
feedbacks, not addressing the free-rider problem through selective club goods. Moreover, 
in order to facilitate the necessary political and normative feedbacks, the minilateral club 
must reach a critical mass through the participation of a great power. It must also be the 
legal centrefold of any regime architecture, rather than a number of fragmented outside 




or lion and operate by a clear legal framework that can give a critical mass visibility and 
legitimacy.  
For the second framing debate, substance versus participation in treaties, 
participation is the most dynamic variable and is likely to increase over time due to 
feedbacks inherent in some environmental issues, particularly climate change. 
Accordingly, substance should be prioritised over participation in environmental 
agreements as long as the initial membership includes a wolf (China) or lion (the US, or 
possibly the EU). Plurilateralism is preferable, provided the necessary feedbacks and 
leadership exist. 
 
8.2 Contributions to Methodology  
Methodologically, this thesis presents a unique application of systems thinking 
principles (through the use of influence diagrams, systems archetypes and causal loop 
analysis) to issues in international relations. While this has previously been done for 
issues such as health and ecosystem services, the use of such a systems thinking-based 
framework is less prevalent in international relations, particularly in the field of 
international environmental governance. This approach provides a common thread 
amongst the various case studies in this research. Systems thinking applied through these 
methods is, as demonstrated, a beneficial way of framing research in international politics, 
by creating a visual expression of complex relationships, allowing for the investigation 
of underlying mechanisms such as feedback loops and leverage points, and aiding in the 
creation of scenarios and models. The theory of CMG presented in Chapter VII is 
essentially a theory of feedbacks: it explains the successes and failures of plurilateral 




there is a role for systems thinking in studies of global governance and politics. Systems 
thinking and its related concepts can provide a useful lens for both analysing international 
institutions and suggesting policy-relevant interventions.   
8.3 Contributions to Policy 
The policy implications of this thesis are manifold:  
• For the climate negotiations, a new approach is needed to achieve an outcome that 
is effective, is legally binding and operates with or without US legal participation. 
This new approach would require policy makers and diplomats to move towards 
a more decentralised approach that uses numerous connected opt-out protocols 
that are designed to grow in participation over time.  
• Whether it is implemented through the UNFCCC or the 2015 climate agreement, 
policy makers should consider a switch away from consensus towards layered 
majority voting.  
• A movement away from needing global approval and universal participation could 
be the most effective way of pursuing multilateralism in the future.  
 
While this research does present some interesting and useful findings, it 
nonetheless has a number of important limitations that should be noted. First, the analysis 
and empirical data are largely constrained to the climate regime (with the sole exception 
of the first case study on UNEP). While the implications for other MEAs and regimes 
have been highlighted, there is a need for empirical studies of these cases before the idea 
of CMG (particularly through an operational treaty) can be extended to them. As noted 
in Chapter VII, each environmental issue has specific characteristics, and many of the 
feedbacks present in the issue of climate mitigation (e.g. positive spillovers) may not be 




applicable to the climate regime. Second, the analysis across the thesis has primarily 
focused on a state-centric perspective of international politics and institutional reform. 
This analytical concentration has meant that the important role of non-state actors in 
reforming multilateralism, including civil society, subnational entities and corporate 
entities, has been largely omitted. Third, more analysis is needed in the interconnections 
between environmental governance and other regimes, as this is a key factor that will 
determine what steps countries are willing to take without the US. The economic and 
military strength of the US means that diplomatic snubs in relation to the environment 
could lead to retaliations in the WTO, the UN Security Council or other international fora. 
Multilateralism must be seen as an interconnected system – only then can the political 
feasibility of governance without the US be discerned.  
A number of important findings and ideas discussed in this thesis could provide 
the basis for future research in relation to environmental multilateralism. Areas of future 
research have been highlighted at the end of Chapters III, IV, V, VI and VII. Further 
research on the CMG conceptual framework and theory would be particularly useful.  
First and foremost, the framework should be applied to the initial case study of UNEP, to 
further analyse the feasibility and probability of a critical mass WEO occurring. It would 
also be interesting and useful to explore the potential use of sole-executive agreements in 
relation to constructing a WEO, and, if it is legally possible, why this has not been 
pursued. A more in-depth application of the framework to the CBD, and other regimes, 
would be particularly useful to further discern why plurilateral efforts fail and succeed. 
Further empirical analysis of the effect of positive spillovers and feedbacks from 
unilateral actions would also be useful. If, as the vast majority empirical findings suggest, 




economic foundation for the CMG approach and undermine the preoccupation of 
environmental multilateralism with free-riding and competitiveness.  
Competing theories and discourses about participation in environmental 
multilateralism mark current academic and diplomatic discourse. This indicates an 
intellectual effort to deal with the diffusion of power internationally and the loss of US 
leadership. This research suggests that fitting environmental multilateralism to the 
geopolitical order means going beyond these existing debates and instead focusing on the 
dynamics of feedbacks. As long as one of the great powers is initially involved and the 
necessary feedbacks exist, a critical mass dynamic can evolve. This is what the theory of 
CMG embodies. Meeting the challenges of the Anthropocene is unlikely to require a 
universal global effort right from the initial stages. Staying within our planetary 





Chapter IX: Epilogue  
9.1 Reflections on the Paris Climate Agreement   The Paris Climate Agreement was adopted by consensus on the 12th of December 
2015, shortly after the submission of this thesis. The agreement has since been signed by 
175 countries. It has been heralded by many as a diplomatic success and a watershed 
moment for the climate regime. It is by nature a broad-but-shallow agreement that is 
intended to allow for US legal participation, and therefore has important implications for 
this thesis. This epilogue will briefly analyse the Paris Climate Agreement and reflect on 
its implications for the thesis and CMG framework.  
 The Paris Climate Agreement runs contrary to the recommendations of this thesis 
and yet also fits the predictions put forward in Chapter V. This thesis, particularly in 
Chapter VII, recommended that the climate regime would be best served by a form of 
exclusive CMG without US leadership, or an inclusive CMG model whereby an 
agreement allows for US ratification but with a split structure that allows for fast progress 
via voting. In either case, plurilateralism is key. Instead, the Paris Agreement seeks 
universal participation and US involvement at the expense of structure and substance. It 
is a pledge and review agreement with a long-term goal of limiting global average 
temperature rise to well below 2°C. Submitted INDCs are not legally binding upon 
countries. However, the agreement as a whole is a legal treaty with obligations for 
countries to submit, maintain and update their NDCs. NDCs are to be updated on a five-
yearly basis, with a corresponding global stocktake of emissions trajectories. Each NDC 
must be more ambitious than the previously submitted one. There are no non-party or 
enforcement measures: financial commitments and the compliance mechanism are 




allow for US legal participation through a presidential-executive agreement. The lack of 
binding financial or mitigation commitments means that the agreement can be legally 
adopted by the executive without the consent of the US Congress. This matches the 
scenario of ‘Pledge and Review with Varied Legality and Participation’ presented in 
Chapter V. However, the agreement lacks opt-out clauses, further sacrificing substance 
for uniform and (intended) universal participation. The theory of CMG would suggest 
that trading substance and structure in exchange for broad participation and US 
involvement is a mistake.  
In the eyes of the CMG framework, the Paris Climate Agreement is unlikely to 
meet its own lofty ambitions. The agreement appears both vulnerable to a non-party US 
and incapable of triggering the feedbacks necessary to limit a temperature rise well below 
2°C. As Chapter VI discusses in depth, the Paris Agreement has no real way of managing 
a non-party US or any other recalcitrant state. A US withdrawal could undermine the 
single greatest advantage of the agreement: its legitimacy through broad participation. 
Even with continued US involvement, the agreement looks set to fail in the long term. 
 Current country pledges, if met, equate to a rise of 2.7–3.5°C. The agreement 
relies on two unproven ways of creating economic and political feedback to increase 
ambition over time. The first feedback process is that of peer pressure. The underlying 
assumption is that the ‘name and shame’ process of pledging and reviewing will 
diplomatically pressure countries into heightening their ambition over time. Such an idea 
lacks empirical support or a strong precedent. Moreover, the notion that countries would 
change their policies based on a global stocktake and non-punitive compliance 
mechanism seems tentative at best. The second feedback mechanism is a market and 
policy ‘signal’. This is the idea that the establishment of agreed long-term goals provides 




again, the empirical evidence for the strength of such simple goal-setting exercises is 
lacking. Long-term goals appear to be unlikely to possess such power if short-term actions 
do not lend them credibility. Based on the perspective provided by the CMG analytical 
framework, the Paris Agreement does not appear to have the features necessary to trigger 
deep economic and political feedbacks. From the perspective provided from this thesis, 
the agreement simply places too much faith in the short-term support of a single US 
president.   
 
9.2 The Implications of Paris for the Thesis and CMG Framework  
 The Paris Climate Agreement has a number of important implications for this 
thesis. First it confirms the hypothesis of this thesis in that US participation and leadership 
are central to the success or failure of international environmental governance. Indeed, 
the central factor moulding the outcomes of the Paris Agreement, which will be the heart 
of the climate regime for decades to come, was the desire for US legal involvement. 
Further, the predictions and analysis of this thesis appear to have been at least in part 
accurate, with Chapter V largely predicting the shape, substance and rationale of the Paris 
Climate Agreement. Second, it is quite clear that while the US may no longer be a 
hegemon, the world is not ready to move on without them. For now, exclusive CMG is 
simply not politically feasible. Moreover, the value placed on broad participation appears 
to have grown. The primary point of praise for Paris was its universal adoption and the 
all-encompassing nature of the NDC process. This also makes inclusive CMG unfeasible, 
at least in the short time. The world appears to be heading in exactly the opposite direction 
that this thesis would suggest. This by no means undermines the findings or ideas of this 
thesis; however, it does signify that CMG is not part of the current zeitgeist. Instead, the 




become legitimised. Currently it is difficult to analyse the implications of the Paris 
Agreement for the CMG framework and theory. Whether it proves or refutes the 
explanatory and predictive power of the CMG framework remains to be seen. As 
suggested by the analysis in this epilogue and Chapter VI, the Paris Agreement is weak 
in strength and vulnerable to a US withdrawal. The world may have to pay a price to learn 
that US participation comes at a high cost. Perhaps it will be the cost of the 2°C goal.  
 While it appears that a CMG treaty will not be central to the climate regime, there 
is nonetheless room for plurilateral agreements in the future. Climate clubs for linking 
domestic policies, including formally connecting emissions trading schemes, will likely 
emerge in a bottom-up world of climate governance. Moreover, depending on the fate of 
the Paris Agreement, the desire for a semi-global approach may rekindle. This could occur 
within or outside the climate regime. A US withdrawal, or simple failure of the pledge 
and review system, could be enough to delegitimise universalism and the appeal of US 
involvement. CMG may still hold important lessons for multilateralism in the 
Anthropocene, but they are lessons that the world appears not yet to have learned. 
  




Appendix I: Interviewee List 
 
This appendix provides a list of interviewees. The list of interviewees is detail 
the origins and backgrounds of each interviewee, but maintains anonymity, as this was 
the selected and agreed mode of communication with interviewees due to the sensitive 
nature of diplomatic information. Negotiators are described only by 
developed/developing country status, as listing the country or region could jeopardise 
their identity. Others (NGOs, academic, civil service officials) are described by their 
region. 
 
Chapter III: Interviewees 
 
Interviewee Details (profession, origin) 
Interviewee A Academic, Asia-Pacific. 
Interviewee B Academic, Europe. 
Interviewee C Academic (formerly UNEP), North 
America. 
Interviewee D Academic (formerly UNEP), North 
America. 
Interviewee E High-level UNEP official, Europe. 
Interviewee F High-level UNEP official, Europe 
(stationed in Nairobi). 
Interviewee G Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee H Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee I Negotiator, developing country. 
Interviewee J Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee K NGO, North America. 




Chapter IV Interviewees  
Interviewee Details (profession, origin) 
Interviewee A Academic, North America. 
Interviewee B Academic (formerly UNFCCC 
Secretariat), Europe. 
Interviewee C Academic, Asia-Pacific. 
Interviewee D Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee E Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee F Negotiator, developing country. 
Interviewee G Negotiator, developing country. 
Interviewee H Negotiator, developing country. 
Interviewee I NGO (formerly UNFCCC 
Secretariat), Europe. 
Interviewee J Former high-level UNFCCC 
Secretariat member, Europe. 
Interviewee K High-level UNFCCC Secretariat 
member, Africa. 
Interviewee L High-level UNFCCC Secretariat 
member, North America. 
Interviewee M NGO representative, Europe.  
Interviewees Chapters V and VI  
Please note that these interviews were not directly used as data, but served as a 
way to provide context and orientations for these papers. 
 
Interviewee Details (profession, origin) 
Interviewee A Academic, North America. 




Interviewee C Academic, Asia-Pacific. 
Interviewee D Academic, Europe. 
Interviewee E Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee F Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee G Negotiator, developed country. 
Interviewee H Negotiator, developing country. 





Appendix II: A Supplementary Paper   This appendix contains a published discussion paper, a modified version of 
Chapter IV that was published as a peer-reviewed discussion paper with the Free 
University of Berlin. This version is expanded and makes greater use of causal loop 
analysis.   
 
 










































































































    
 
